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NAVIGATING THROUGH THE FOG OF VERTICAL 
MERGER LAW: A GUIDE TO COUNSELLING 
HOSPITAL-PHYSICIAN CONSOLIDATION UNDER THE 
CLAYTON ACT 
Thomas L. Greaney & Douglas Ross* 
Abstract: Lawyers assessing legality under the antitrust laws of hospital acquisitions of 
physician practices face a quandary. The case law is sparse, federal enforcement guidance 
outdated, and academic input conflicting. Applying these muddled standards in the rapidly-
evolving health care sector only magnifies the uncertainty. While most transactions will be 
competitively neutral or beneficial, rapidly evolving market conditions causing integration 
between hospitals and physicians present opportunities for consolidations that may harm 
consumer interests. Indeed, given the highly concentrated structure of many hospital markets 
in the nation, preemptive acquisitions of physician practices may be a tempting strategy for 
some to undermine competition. This Article offers guidance by analyzing potential theories 
of competitive harm and addressing factual elements necessary to establish a violation of 
antitrust merger law. 
 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 200	
I.	 CASE LAW, THEORIES, AND EVIDENCE OF 
COMPETITIVE HARM ................................................................ 202	
A.	 Vertical Merger Law ............................................................ 202	
B.	 Antitrust Analysis of Physician Acquisitions ....................... 206	
C.	 Economic Effects of Physician Acquisitions ....................... 212	
II.	 COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF VERTICAL MERGERS ............. 216	
A.	 Foreclosure ........................................................................... 216	
1.	 General Principles ....................................................... 216	
2.	 Foreclosure of PCPs ................................................... 217	
3.	 Foreclosure in Specialty Physician Markets ............... 222	
B.	 Potential Competition ........................................................... 226	
C.	 Avoidance of Regulation and Similar Strategies .................. 227	
                                                      
* Thomas L. Greaney is a Chester A. Myers Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for 
Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University School of Law. Douglas Ross lectures at the University 
of Washington School of Law and is a partner with Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, in Seattle, 
Washington. The authors would like to thank Abigail Wood for research assistance. The participants 
in the symposium, Healthcare in the 21st Century: The Role of Competition, held at the Seattle 
University School of Law in September 2016, provided many helpful comments. In particular, 
Douglas A. Conrad, Professor of Health Services at the University of Washington, provided 
extensive comments for which the authors are very grateful. This Article is the product of a 
collaboration between the authors and as such should not be taken as representing the views of each 
on every point addressed. 
11 - Greaney Ross.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/1/16  1:04 PM 
200 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:199 
 
D.	 Increased Bargaining Leverage and Reduced Network 
Competition .......................................................................... 237	
III.	 MITIGATING FACTORS ............................................................. 238	
A.	 Ease of Entry ........................................................................ 239	
B.	 The Power Buyer Factor ....................................................... 244	
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 251	
 
INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers assessing the legality of vertical mergers under antitrust laws 
face a quandary. The case law is sparse, federal enforcement guidance 
outdated, and academic input conflicting. Applying these muddled 
standards in the rapidly-evolving health care sector only magnifies the 
uncertainty. Yet given the current wave of acquisitions of physician 
practices by hospitals1 and the commitment of the federal antitrust 
agencies to place a high priority on curbing health care consolidation,2 
many practitioners are struggling to give sound advice as to whether 
such mergers might run afoul of the Clayton Act.3 This Article seeks to 
supply guidance on several thorny issues lawyers and courts must 
confront in this area. 
Although the federal antitrust enforcement agencies, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) and United States Department of Justice 
(DOJ) (the Agencies), have devoted considerable resources to 
challenging mergers of acute care hospitals, only recently have physician 
mergers come under antitrust scrutiny. The increased attention is a 
natural response to the wholesale changes in provider relationships 
spurred by health care reform and pressure from commercial payers to 
encourage providers to accept new forms of reimbursement, manage 
                                                      
1. See Margot Sanger-Katz, When Hospitals Buy Doctors’ Offices, and Patient Fees Soar, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/07/upshot/medicare-proposal-would-even-
out-doctors-pay.html [https://perma.cc/BV4D-NAVA] (describing motives for rapid increase in 
physician employment and quoting former executive of American College of Cardiology describing 
the shift as “like a migration of wildebeests”). 
2. See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Retrospectives at the FTC: Promoting 
an Antitrust Agenda, ABA Retrospective Analysis of Agency Determinations in Merger 
Transactions Symposium (June 28, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/public_statements/retrospectives-ftc-promoting-antitrust-agenda/130628aba-antitrust.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WQ5H-2M2G] (stating there would be “great value in examining more closely the 
effects of combinations that have a significant vertical element” such as acquisitions of physician 
practices). 
3. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012), prohibits certain mergers or acquisitions 
where the effect of the transaction “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly.” 
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care, and accept financial risk. Organizational changes in response to the 
legislative impetus to deliver care in a seamless and coordinated manner 
include accountable care organizations and patient centered medical 
homes along with a revival of various forms of joint ventures and 
alliances. Providers have responded by consolidating horizontally; thus, 
many physicians in small and large practices have merged into single 
specialty or multispecialty practices, and hospitals that already employ 
physicians have expanded their ownership of practices.4 There has also 
been a pronounced increase in mergers that, in terms of competitive 
effect, are purely vertical, i.e., hospitals acquiring physician practices. 
Because vertical mergers—consolidations joining firms providing 
different or complementary products or services in the production of a 
product—are likely to entail efficiency benefits even as they sometimes 
impair competition, assessments of net competitive effects are inevitably 
fraught. Moreover, given the probable clinical and administrative 
efficiencies flowing from integration of health services, evaluations of 
hospital employment of physicians need to proceed with caution. At the 
same time, antitrust analyses of possible vertical anticompetitive effects 
may be warranted based on recent evidence that some acquisitions of 
physicians’ practices by hospitals result in higher physician prices. 
The few cases brought by the Agencies and state attorneys general 
that have proceeded to judgment or settlement all involve horizontal 
consolidations, usually a hospital expanding its number of employed 
physicians by acquiring additional practices; one older lawsuit involving 
a challenge by a rival hospital to a rival’s employment of physicians 
applied a vertical analysis and found plaintiff’s case wanting in several 
respects. While these cases shed light on some issues involved in 
analyzing a purely vertical merger, many important matters remain 
unaddressed. Moreover, Agency challenges to vertical mergers have 
rarely been litigated to a decision,5 and the Vertical Merger Guidelines 
are badly outdated.6 Adding to the uncertainty is the fact that new 
                                                      
4. Victoria Stagg Elliott, Increase in Physician Practice Mergers and Acquisitions Expected to 
Continue, AM. MED. NEWS (Aug.14, 2012), www.amednews.com/article/20120814/business/ 
308149997/8/ [https://perma.cc/L693-W2VV] (describing physician mergers among large practices 
and hospitals). 
5. The last reported decision involving an agency challenge to a vertical merger was decided by 
the Second Circuit over thirty-five years ago. Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979). 
The Agencies have filed complaints against several vertical mergers since then but have resolved 
these by consent orders rather than litigation. See James A. Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, Getting 
Vertical Mergers Through the Agencies: “Let’s Make a Deal,” 29 ANTITRUST ABA 10, 17 nn.32–
50 (2015); M. Howard Morse, Vertical Mergers: Recent Learning, 53 BUS. LAW. 1217, 1226–45 
(1998). The Agencies have never filed a case challenging a vertical merger in health care. 
6. The 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines have received little attention in the courts and 
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economic learning regarding vertical effects has yet to be incorporated 
into precedent. Finally, applying antitrust principles in health care is 
always a tricky undertaking, as market imperfections and the rapid pace 
of change make predictions predicated on the past unreliable.7 Yet 
lawyers must advise clients, the Agencies need to make sound 
enforcement decisions, and courts inevitably will chart new territory. 
To help penetrate the fog, we examine several issues that are likely to 
be central to analyzing hospital acquisitions of physician practices under 
the antitrust laws. In Part I, we review the case law and the economic 
theories applicable to analyzing vertical mergers. In Part II, we discuss 
first how allegations of competitive harm through foreclosure should be 
addressed in the context of acquisitions of primary care practices and 
specialty groups. We then assess challenges to acquisitions of physician 
practices under three alternative theories of competitive harm: loss of 
potential competition, avoidance of regulation, and increased bargaining 
leverage. Finally, in Part III, we discuss two important mitigating factors 
likely to be raised by potential defendants: ease of entry and the power 
buyer factor. 
I. CASE LAW, THEORIES, AND EVIDENCE OF COMPETITIVE 
HARM 
A. Vertical Merger Law 
The early cases addressing vertical mergers following amendments to 
the Clayton Act were based on the harms flowing from foreclosure. In 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,8 the Court identified “[t]he primary 
vice of a vertical merger” as “foreclosing the competitors of either party 
from a segment of the market”9 but neglected to specify the degree of 
foreclosure or market conditions necessary to prompt condemnation. 
Responding to Brown Shoe and subsequent cases also finding small 
                                                      
focus on harms from reducing the probability of entry and facilitating collusion; The term 
“foreclosure” does not appear in the Guidelines. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 
(June 29, 1984), www.justice.gov/atr/non-horizontal-merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/5HGY-
HB4Y]; see also Keyte & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 11 (guidelines provide “only a modicum of 
insight into how the Agencies currently make enforcement decisions about vertical mergers”). 
7. Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago’s Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust in Health Care, 71 
ANTITRUST L.J. 857 (2004); Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: Hospital 
Mergers and Antitrust Law, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 191 (1997). 
8. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
9. Id. at 323–24. 
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levels of foreclosure sufficient to invoke the Clayton Act,10 courts began 
in the 1970s to qualify the analysis by insisting on evidence of 
anticompetitive impact beyond mere proof of foreclosure.11 With the 
ascendency of Chicago School analysis in the 1980s, vertical merger 
analysis moved decidedly away from its origins in Brown Shoe, as 
scholars and antitrust officials credited potential efficiencies flowing 
from improved coordination in pricing, production, and design that can 
reduce costs and improve product quality.12 Indeed, some critiques 
questioned whether competitive harm could ever arise from vertical 
mergers,13 and enforcement efforts all but disappeared.14 In 1984, the 
                                                      
10. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972) (holding that Ford’s 
acquisition of a spark plug manufacturer violated section 7 of the Clayton Act because it foreclosed 
other spark plug manufacturers from selling to Ford, which accounted for about ten percent of all 
spark plug sales); United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1967) 
(finding that foreclosure of fourteen percent of the market supported showing of violation of section 
7 of the Clayton Act). 
11. See, e.g., Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979). Herbert Hovenkamp 
summarizes the flaws of the early foreclosure cases as follows: 
The problem with the traditional foreclosure analysis was that it was overly aggressive. First, it 
condemned mergers where the percentage foreclosure was far too small, often less than 10 
percent. Second, it had very little theory about how foreclosure could yield reduced output and 
higher prices. Foreclosure was largely thought of as an evil for its own sake. 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
257, 323–24; see also Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, Foreclosure, and Consumer Harm, 
70 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 312 (2002) (noting that in antitrust challenges to exclusive dealing 
arrangements, which are a form of vertical integration short of merger, “[i]ncreasingly, the courts 
are focusing on the effect of the challenged arrangement on the defendant’s market power, rather 
than foreclosure as such”). 
12. The “Chicago School of industrial organization economics” has been succinctly described as 
scholarship that “refuted the dominant structure-conduct-performance paradigm in the 1970s,” 
while the “Chicago School of antitrust analysis,” which originated with Aaron Director at the 
University of Chicago and was “developed more fully by Richard Posner, Robert Bork, Frank 
Easterbrook,” and others, has been described as “transform[ing] antitrust by eliminating or eroding 
per se illegality of vertical restraints and placing merger analysis on a sounder economic footing.” 
William H. Page, Josh Wright’s “Chicago School Papers”: An Overview, ANTITRUST SOURCE, 
Apr. 2013, at 5, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/apr13_ 
papertrail.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AR9-MKEC]. “Post-Chicago antitrust,” in contrast, 
“has shown that some vertical restraints can reduce efficiency by raising rivals’ costs in certain 
defined circumstances.” Id. Post-Chicago antitrust is associated with a number of academics, 
including Robert Pitofsky, Steven Salop, Jonathan Baker, and Carl Shapiro. See, e.g., Jonathan B. 
Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in HOW THE CHICAGO 
SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. 
ANTITRUST 235 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008); Robert Pitofsky, Introduction: Setting the Stage, in 
HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST, supra, at 3, 6; Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, 
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 
(1986). 
13. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 225 (1978). See also Herbert 
Hovenkamp’s summation of Robert Bork’s “beguilingly simple” account of the competitive effects 
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DOJ issued Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines that identified harms 
from creating entry barriers and facilitating collusion without mention of 
foreclosure.15 
Post-Chicago scholarship has moved the pendulum back to some 
extent. Challenging the claim that “virtually all exclusion claims are 
chimerical,”16 economists have demonstrated that under certain 
conditions exclusionary strategies can profit firms and harm 
competition.17 This account identifies risks that “input foreclosure” and 
“customer foreclosure” can create or enhance market power in upstream 
(e.g., physician services) markets or downstream (hospital services) 
markets.18 Post-Chicagoans qualify foreclosure analysis by requiring 
                                                      
of vertical mergers:  
If vertical integration creates efficiencies, then a vertically integrated firm would have cost 
advantages over unintegrated rivals. [This might] deter entry, but it is not antitrust’s purpose to 
condemn cost savings. Second, if vertical integration did not create any efficiencies, then it 
would not impede entry by anyone. Firms that wished to enter at one stage alone could contract 
with firms at the other stage and be just as efficient as the vertically integrated firm. Third, if 
vertical integration resulted in higher costs, then vertically integrated firms would decline in 
favor of unintegrated firms. Fourth, in competitively structured markets vertical integration 
would lead to self-dealing, but that would do no more than force realignment in purchasing and 
sale patterns. Bork’s observations were built on an extraordinarily narrow conception of entry 
barriers. He barely mentioned patents or other intellectual property rights. There was no 
conception that sunk costs plus risk could facilitate entry deterrence. 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Robert Bork and Vertical Integration: Leverage, Foreclosure, and Efficiency, 
SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK (Oct. 28, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2272977 [https://perma.cc/24Q7-EAVV]. 
14. See Remarks of J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Challenge of Non-
Horizontal Merger Enforcement, Fordham Competition Law Institute’s 34th Annual Conference on 
International Antitrust Law & Policy 11–12 (Sept. 27–28, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/public_statements/challenge-non-horizontal-merger-enforcement/070927-28non-
horizontalmerger_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/625B-4P6N] (observing that the constrained view of 
foreclosure and expansive view of efficiencies led to no litigated merger challenges since the 
adoption of the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1984). 
15. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,834 (June 29, 1984). 
16. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 12, at 213–14; Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, 
Potential Competitive Effects of Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide for Practitioners 6 (Dec. 8, 
2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=2404&context=facpub [https://perma.cc/6YKF-2HCP] (“Vertical mergers seldom involve 
firms that have monopolies protected by prohibitive entry barriers. If there is no monopoly, then 
there is no single monopoly profit.”). 
17. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 12, at 213–14; Salop & Culley, supra note 16, at 6; see 
also Steven C. Salop, Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Vertical Conduct: Where Chicago Has 
Overshot the Mark, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF 
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST, supra note 12, at 141, 142; Michael H. 
Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 
ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995); Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion As a Core Competition Concern (2013) 
(Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 279, 2013), http://digitalcommons. 
wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/279 [https://perma.cc/SAS3-VMLG].  
18. See Salop & Culley, supra note 16, at 13–14 (explaining potential exclusionary effects of 
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significant foreclosure, identifying criteria for determining whether a 
particular foreclosure is likely to produce competitive harm, and 
generally associating “foreclosure” with raising rivals’ costs rather than 
with outright market exclusion.19 Thus, analysis turns on the ability of 
the merging parties to harm consumers by disadvantaging their 
competitors: “[r]ivals are simply placed in a position where their profit-
maximizing price is higher after the merger than it was before. The 
integrating firm can then raise its own prices as well.”20 Besides 
exclusionary effects, Post-Chicago analyses have identified other 
potential harms from vertical mergers, including reducing potential 
competition, increasing coordinated effects,21 enabling evasion of 
regulation,22 and facilitating harmful price discrimination. As happened 
in the 1980s, theory has been translated into action, as the Agencies have 
pursued a number of vertical mergers employing Post-Chicago concepts 
to inform their analyses.23 
As elsewhere in antitrust law, early foreclosure cases have not been 
overruled; instead, they are largely ignored. What little guidance can be 
found must be gleaned from the Agencies’ settlements of cases. Notably, 
the Agencies have pursued cases in which the merging parties might 
gain the ability to foreclose competitors from obtaining key inputs by 
raising their costs, by foreclosing access to customers, and by facilitating 
                                                      
vertical mergers). Under this analysis, foreclosure of necessary inputs for hospital care, such as 
physician services, can arise from refusals to sell, degradation of quality, or high prices charged to 
rivals of the merged firm. These tactics confer on the merged firm power to raise its price in its 
downstream product, hospital services. The merger could lead to customer foreclosure, by which the 
downstream division of the merged firm reduces or stops purchasing inputs from the other upstream 
firms, which then can disadvantage those firms and provide the upstream division of the merged 
firm with the power to raise its price. Alternatively, the downstream division of the merged firm 
might threaten to refuse to purchase in order to induce the independent input suppliers to raise the 
prices that they charge to its downstream rivals. 
19. Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 323–24. 
20. Id. at 324. 
21. For example, vertical mergers may facilitate coordination in the hospital market by 
weakening the disruptive behavior of a nonintegrated hospital, a strategy that could be implemented 
with targeted input foreclosure or threats of foreclosure. See Salop & Culley, supra note 16, at 25–
26. 
22. As discussed further in the text, in 2008 the FTC challenged a ten-year, exclusive sublicense 
for Venofer, a pharmaceutical product produced by Daiichi Sankyo used by dialysis clinics operated 
by Fresenius Medical Care, which would allow Fresenius to evade Medicare price regulations. 
Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, Fresenius Med. Care 
AG & Co. KGaA & Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd., No. 081-0146 (F.T.C. Sept. 15, 2008), 
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/09/080915freseniusanal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SVR4-ZZYA]. 
23. See Keyte & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 12–14 (noting that the Agencies “gradually ramped 
up vertical merger enforcement” as a result of new economic analysis and citing settlements). 
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future collusion.24 Indicative of the fact that even anticompetitive 
vertical mergers usually have plausible claims to create efficiencies, 
however, the Agencies were willing to resolve these cases by obtaining 
conduct relief rather than insisting on structural remedies.25 Of course, 
each case turns on interpretation of market conditions, such as the 
incentives, probability, and effects of anticipated conduct. While some 
may question the practicality of Post-Chicago analysis,26 it appears to 
have inaugurated closer analysis of vertical mergers by the Agencies and 
evolving economic scholarship aimed at developing econometric tools 
for predicting anticompetitive effects.27 
B. Antitrust Analysis of Physician Acquisitions 
At the outset, we note that physicians and hospitals are not in a 
traditional vertical relationship.28 Hospitals do not purchase the services 
of physicians; instead, they supply facilities for physicians to treat their 
patients subject to the physicians meeting quality and other standards of 
the hospital. Under fee-for-service payment, patients or (more often) 
third-party payers pay hospitals and physicians separately for their 
services.29 However, a form of exchange takes place: physicians supply 
patients to hospitals or serve patients in specialty services in return for 
use of the hospitals’ facilities without charge. Moreover, it is clear that 
                                                      
24. Id. at 12–13. 
25. See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Google Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00688 
(D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/497671/download 
[https://perma.cc/3SLQ-3KZ8] (resolving concerns that Google might be able to raise rivals’ costs 
by virtue of acquiring a licensor of valuable software needed by competitors by agreements to 
license the software for “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms” for five years and other 
commitments). 
26. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 325 (“Assessing the overall competitive impact of a 
vertical merger [under Post-Chicago principles] . . . strains the fact finding abilities of a court, 
although perhaps not to the breaking point.”); John E. Lopatka & Paul E. Godek, Another Look at 
Alcoa: Raising Rivals’ Costs Does Not Improve the View, 35 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1992). 
27. Serge Moresi & Steven C. Salop, vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical 
Mergers, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 185 (2013). 
28. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1000a (3d ed. 2009) (describing a “vertical 
merger” as a merger “between a firm selling a particular product or service and a firm that buys that 
product or service”). 
29. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 339 n.7 (1982) (explaining fee-for-
service payment and contrasting it with fixed, per subscriber payment provided by health 
maintenance organizations); Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 
1406, 1409–10 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining incentive of fee-for-service payment is to provide too 
many services while the incentive of a fixed, per subscriber payment, more often referred to as 
capitated payment, is to provide too few services). 
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physicians provide a critical input for hospitals to supply their services. 
Therefore, a vertical framework is appropriate for antitrust analysis. 
The handful of physician merger cases brought by state and federal 
antitrust enforcers that proceeded to judgment or were settled by consent 
decree all involve horizontal combinations. As discussed below, with the 
exception of one suit filed by a private plaintiff almost twenty years ago, 
no reported cases or advisory opinions address the vertical effects of 
physician-hospital combinations. Thus far, the Agencies and state 
attorneys general have gone after relatively easy targets: mergers to near 
monopoly in well-defined physician services and often in markets with 
some history of prior consolidation. Nevertheless, these cases do provide 
precedent and guidance on certain issues highly relevant to cases 
brought under a vertical theory of harm. 
The first Agency challenge to a physician merger, concluded in 2012, 
involved acquisition of two cardiology groups by the largest hospital 
system in the Reno, Nevada area.30 Together the acquisitions made the 
system the employer of eighty-eight percent of the active cardiologists in 
the market.31 The FTC entered a consent order that did not enjoin the 
merger but rather required the system to release physicians from 
covenants not to compete.32 In a more recent challenge to a physician 
merger, also resolved by consent order, the FTC charged that a merger 
among six small practices that combined nineteen of the twenty-five 
orthopedists in Berks County, Pennsylvania, was anticompetitive.33 By 
the time the agency and the defendants entered into a proposed consent 
order, however, six orthopedists had left the merged entity, reducing its 
                                                      
30. In re Renown Health, No. C-4366 (F.T.C. Dec. 4, 2012), www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/1110101/renown-health-matter [https://perma.cc/XF43-C2GU]. 
31. Complaint at 19, In re Renown Health, No. C-4366 (F.T.C. Aug. 3, 2012), 
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/12/120806renownhealthcmpt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BDU7-F9HC]. 
32. Before commencing the Renown litigation, the FTC investigated a proposed acquisition of 
two cardiology groups constituting sixty percent of cardiologists in the relevant market by 
Providence Health Care in Spokane, Washington. The investigation was concluded when 
Providence abandoned the deal and acquired one of the two groups. DAVID A. ETTINGER, 
HONIGMAN MILLER SCHWARTZ & COHN LLP, CURRENT ANTITRUST ISSUES RELATING TO 
PHYSICIAN MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND COMBINATIONS, https://www.healthlawyers.org/events/ 
programs/materials/documents/phy12/papers/b_ettinger.pdf [https://perma.cc/WMB7-B3LQ]; 
Closing Letter from Donald S. Clark, Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Douglas C. Ross, Esq. (Mar. 
21, 2011), www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/closing-letters/providence-health-services-
spokane-cardiology-hearts [https://perma.cc/4TFF-7DTT]. 
33. Keystone Orthopaedic Specialists, LLC, No. 141 0025 (F.T.C. Oct. 21, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/141-0025/keystone-orthopaedic-specialists-llc-
orthopaedic-associates [https://perma.cc/UVQ8-MNZW]. 
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share of the market from seventy-six percent to fifty-two percent.34 The 
FTC consent order required the merged entity and the departing 
orthopedists to obtain prior approval from the agency before acquiring 
another practice in the county or hiring an orthopedist who provided 
services in the county within a year of being hired.35 Together, these 
cases signal the FTC’s heightened concern about physician 
consolidations and its position that physician specialty services may 
constitute distinct product markets in localized geographic regions. 
In its first litigated case, Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. 
v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd. (St. Luke’s),36 the FTC successfully 
challenged the acquisition of a physician group by a health system. St. 
Luke’s, which owned hospitals and employed doctors, acquired the 
largest and most prestigious group of primary care physicians (PCPs) in 
Nampa, a city approximately twenty miles west of Boise, Idaho, the 
capital and largest city in the state.37 With its acquisition of Saltzer, St. 
Luke’s added sixteen PCPs to the seven it had previously acquired, 
giving it approximately an eighty percent share of adult primary care 
services in Nampa County.38 The acquisition resulted in a post-merger 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 6219, with an increase of 1607.39 
Examining the merger as a horizontal combination in the market for 
adult PCP services in the highly localized geographic market of Nampa, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s 
decision that St. Luke’s acquisition violated Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act.40 The decision supports the FTC’s view that many, perhaps most, 
physician services markets are local and, in the case of primary care, 
may be smaller than local hospital markets. The case underscores the 
now well-established lesson of recent hospital merger cases: internal 
                                                      
34. Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, Keystone 
Orthopaedic Specialists, LLC, F.T.C. No. 141 0025, www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
cases/151015keystoneanalysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9CL-F44L].  
35. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Two Pennsylvania Orthopedic Practices Settle FTC 
Charges that Merger Harmed Competition and Inflated Prices (Oct. 15, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/10/two-pennsylvania-orthopedic-practices-
settle-ftc-charges-merger [https://perma.cc/F9V2-87TA]. 
36. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 
775 (9th Cir. 2015). 
37. Id. at 781 (stating that Nampa is twenty miles from Boise); Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr-Nampa, 
Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), Nos. 12-CV-00560-BLW, 13-CV-00116-BLW, 
2014 WL 407446, at *3 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014) (finding that Saltzer was “a very prestigious group 
with a long history”), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015). 
38. St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *3, *8–9. 
39. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 786. 
40. Id. at 781. 
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documents and buyer testimony will carry the day even in the face of 
claims of changing market conditions. Further, on appeal the Ninth 
Circuit firmly rejected an efficiencies defense predicated on the 
incentives created by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to move away 
from inefficient fee-for-service payments and adopt an integrated 
delivery model that would provide cost savings and better care.41 In 
doing so, it went beyond the district court’s finding that the purported 
quality improvements were not merger specific because integrated 
delivery could be accomplished through a variety of contractual and 
joint venture arrangements.42 It seemed to question whether efficiencies 
would ever justify a highly concentrative merger, especially where the 
justification was premised only on an enhanced ability “to better serve 
patients” as opposed to lowering the cost of providing care and 
ultimately lowering prices charged to health plans.43 This holding is 
unique to the Ninth Circuit and is subject to the criticism that it ignores 
the need to assess efficiencies in view of their effect on quality-adjusted 
prices.44 
State attorneys general have challenged physician mergers on several 
occasions, all resulting in settlements or abandonment of the 
                                                      
41. Id. at 791–92. 
42. The district court seemed to acknowledge that the merger had the propensity to improve 
quality. St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *25 (“In a world that was not governed by the Clayton Act, 
the best result might be to approve the Acquisition and monitor its outcome to see if the predicted 
price increases actually occurred. In other words, the Acquisition could serve as a controlled 
experiment . . . . But the Clayton Act is in full force, and it must be enforced. The Act does not give 
the Court discretion to set it aside to conduct a health care experiment.”). 
43. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 791; id. at 790 (“We remain skeptical about the efficiencies defense in 
general and about its scope in particular. It is difficult enough in § 7 cases to predict whether a 
merger will have future anticompetitive effects without also adding to the judicial balance a 
prediction of future efficiencies.”). The Ninth Circuit went on to quote a passage from Brown Shoe 
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962), rarely cited favorably elsewhere, that questioned 
efficiencies: “[c]ongress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the 
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in 
favor of decentralization.” The court also noted that prominent Chicagoans are skeptical of an 
efficiencies defense. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 133 (2d ed. 2001) (“[T]here 
should be no general defense of efficiency . . . . It is rarely feasible to determine by the methods of 
litigation the effect of a merger on the costs of the firm created by the merger.”). 
44. John J. Miles, FTC Notches Yet Another Victory in a Provider Merger Case, OBER KALER 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, HEALTH L. ALERT (2015), http://www.ober.com/publications/2861-ftc-
notches-yet-another-victory-provider-merger-case [https://perma.cc/6WM2-RZB8]. Despite its 
victory in St. Luke’s, the FTC has made clear it will continue carefully to examine claims of 
efficiencies in hospital mergers. See discussion infra at note 89. And the Agencies’ joint Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines make clear they consider legitimate claims of efficiencies. U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 
MERGER GUIDELINES], http://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010 
[https://perma.cc/BT5R-T4LX]. 
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acquisition.45 A number of these cases have resulted in so-called 
“conduct remedies” that allow the merger to go forward but require the 
merged entity to abide by certain restrictions. For example, state decrees 
have entailed restrictions on raising prices to commercial insurers;46 
promises that the merged entity will negotiate in “good faith” with 
health plans;47 commitments to tell patients about treatment options 
outside of the merged entity;48 and agreements not to undertake future 
mergers without notification or consent of the attorney general.49 In one 
noteworthy case, a Massachusetts superior court rejected a proposed 
settlement by the state Attorney General that imposed restrictions on 
pricing, bidding with managed care organizations, and future 
acquisitions of physician practices.50 
As mentioned earlier, neither the Agencies nor the courts have 
specifically addressed a physician acquisition as a purely vertical 
combination. Saint Alphonsus, a rival hospital, and a surgery center, had 
challenged the St. Luke’s transaction relying on vertical foreclosure 
theory, arguing that the acquired Saltzer physicians would admit their 
patients to St. Luke’s, thereby foreclosing competition in the hospital 
and outpatient surgery markets.51 Neither the district court nor the court 
                                                      
45. Final Order, Pennsylvania v. Urology of Cent. Pa., Inc., No. 11-01625 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 
2011) (merger of five urology practices resulting in group constituting over half the urologists in the 
relevant market); Consent Decree, State v. MaineHealth, No. BCD-CV-11-08 (Me. Super. Ct. 
2011), http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/attach.php?id=310574&an=1 [https://perma.cc/EH4G 
-5SJR] (acquisition of the largest major cardiology practices in the Portland, Maine, area by a local 
Hospital); Minnesota v. Allina Hosps. & Clinics, No. C6-05-541 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Ramsey Cty. 
2005) (Minnesota Attorney General sued Allina Hospital & Clinics to block acquisition of two 
cardiology groups; complaint alleged Allina already owned area’s largest cardiology group; case 
settled when acquisitions were abandoned). Maine and Pennsylvania have a history of challenging 
allegedly anticompetitive physician acquisitions. Maine v. Me. Heart Surgical Assocs., No. CV96-
336, 1996 WL 773330 (Me. Super. Ct. July 22, 1996) (combination of four separate practices with 
nine of the ten cardiothoracic surgeons in Portland challenged by Attorney General; merger 
permitted under terms of behavioral settlement); Pennsylvania v. Geisinger Health Sys. Found., No. 
1:13-cv-02647 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2013) (acquisition by Geisinger, a health system that employs 
physicians, of another system that employed physicians was challenged and settled under terms of a 
behavioral decree that, for two years, relieved departing physicians from any obligation not to 
compete). 
46. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
47. Urology of Cent. Pa., No. 11-01625. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Commonwealth v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. SUCv2014-02033-BLS2, 2015 WL 
500995, at *4–5 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2015). 
51. See Plaintiffs’ Joint Pretrial Memorandum at 26–30, Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. 
v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), Nos. 12-cv-00560-BLW, 13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 
407446 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
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of appeals decided the vertical claim in light of their decisions to 
condemn the acquisition under the horizontal theory. The district court 
nevertheless made findings that were relevant to the private plaintiff’s 
vertical foreclosure theory but that were not relevant to the court’s 
conclusion that the acquisition was unlawful.52 This perhaps suggests 
that even when confronted with a physician merger that raises purely 
horizontal issues—the aggregation of power in one or more physician 
services markets—courts are acutely aware of the context when a 
prominent hospital will control the merging health practices. And to 
some extent issues can coincide under vertical and horizontal claims. For 
example, the court made findings to the effect that the substantial 
bargaining leverage that St. Luke’s enjoyed for hospital services prior to 
the merger would be enhanced.53 Finally, following a trend in antitrust 
cases involving hospital mergers,54 the St. Luke’s case closely analyzed 
the merger’s effect on the bargaining leverage in the physician services 
market.55 
                                                      
system/files/documents/cases/130910stlukepretrialmemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/GWV9-PTEQ] (the 
FTC did not join in this claim). 
52. Although the district court entered no conclusions on Saint Alphonsus’s claim of vertical 
foreclosure, it entered factual findings that are supportive of the claim. To counter Saint 
Alphonsus’s claim that after the acquisition Saltzer physicians would redirect their patients from 
Saint Alphonsus to St. Luke’s, St. Luke’s pointed to the professional service agreements Saltzer 
physicians signed giving them autonomy to decide where to send their patients. St. Luke’s, 2014 
WL 407446, at *5, *13. The district court was not impressed; noting that after earlier acquisitions, 
acquired physicians increased their referrals to St. Luke’s and decreased referrals to Saint 
Alphonsus. Id. at *13. The court concluded the same likely would occur if the Saltzer physicians 
were acquired. Id. Yet it is unclear what significance the district court attached to this finding. The 
court examined the effect of the acquisition on competition in only one market: the market for adult 
primary care physicians in Nampa. The loss of referrals that Saint Alphonsus, a hospital, would 
suffer is irrelevant to the analysis of harm in that market. It would be highly relevant to an analysis 
of a claim of anticompetitive vertical foreclosure—but the court did not consider that claim. 
53. Id. at *13–14. 
54. See, e.g., FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1083 (N.D. Ill. 2012) 
(examining effect of merger in terms of additional bargaining leverage hospitals would acquire in 
negotiations with managed care organizations). See generally Aviv Nevo, Deputy Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Mergers That Increase Bargaining Leverage, Remarks as 
Prepared for the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and Cornerstone Research 
Conference on Antitrust in Highly Innovative Industries (Jan. 22, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517781/download [https://perma.cc/427W-H38X]. 
55. St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *13–14 (finding the merger would give St. Luke’s a 
“dominant bargaining position over health plans in the Nampa market” and concluding it “highly 
likely that St. Luke’s will use its bargaining leverage over health plan payers to receive increased 
reimbursements that the plans will pass on to consumers in the form of higher health care premiums 
and higher deductibles”). 
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C. Economic Effects of Physician Acquisitions 
Physicians play a central role in their patients’ decision making, 
effectively determining over eighty percent of all personal health care 
spending.56 Moreover, it is well established that physicians exert 
substantial control over patients’ decisions regarding whether to receive 
care and where to receive it.57 Empirical studies show that physician 
recommendations play an important role in their patients’ choice of 
hospitals.58 With regard to acute hospital care, physicians influence 
patient choices by making recommendations about the hospitals in 
which they prefer to provide services or by referring patients to 
admitting physicians who tend to admit patients to specific hospitals. 
Although agency relationships strongly influence many consumer 
decisions, those that are colored by conflicts of interest pose particular 
problems from the standpoint of evaluating the economic efficiency of 
market transactions. This section considers whether employment of 
physicians by hospitals uniformly improves consumer welfare. 
It should come as no surprise that hospitals acquiring physician 
practices expect employee-physicians to refer to their hospitals or to 
refer to specialists who will do so.59 Laws governing self-referrals by 
physicians, the Federal Anti-Kickback Law60 and the Stark Law,61 afford 
broad leeway with regard to referrals by employed physicians, and thus 
provide no significant barrier to meeting these expectations.62 Likewise, 
                                                      
56. Health Care Costs: A Primer, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 1, 2012), 
http://kff.org/report-section/health-care-costs-a-primer-2012-report/ [https://perma.cc/PY2Y-
SYNT]. 
57. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF 
COMPETITION 7 (2004) [hereinafter IMPROVING HEALTH CARE], www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/improving-health-care-dose-competition-report-federal-trade-commission-and-
department-justice/040723healthcarerpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XMB-4FZF] (observing that “[a] 
large majority of consumers purchase health care through multiple agents” that included “providers 
who guide patient choice through referrals and selection of treatments”); Leslie Greenwald et al., 
Specialty Versus Community Hospitals: Referrals, Quality, and Community Benefits, 25 HEALTH 
AFF. 106, 109 (2006) (“[P]hysicians generally drive the decision of which facilities their patients are 
referred to.”). 
58. DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLS., 2011 SURVEY OF HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: KEY FINDINGS, STRATEGIC IMPLICATION 15 (2011), http://www.statecoverage.org/ 
files/Deloitte_US_CHS_2011ConsumerSurveyinUS_062111.pdf [https:// perma.cc/47FM-HSGL]. 
59. Robert Kocher & Nikhil Sahni, Hospitals’ Race to Employ Physicians—The Logic Behind a 
Money-Losing Proposition, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1791 (2011). 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012). 
61. Id. § 1395nn. 
62. See id. § 1395nn(e)(2) (creating an exception under Stark Law for bona fide employment 
relationships). 
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antitrust law does not inhibit intra-system referrals.63 Hospitals are often 
concerned with attempting to gain admissions from doctors who admit to 
more than one hospital (so-called “splitters”). Acquiring the practices of 
splitters is seen as the most direct method of securing their loyalty but 
may disadvantage rival hospitals to which they previously admitted 
patients.64 
Yet physician employment has not proved to be an economic 
bonanza: as a general matter, employment of physicians is a losing 
proposition. Hospitals lose $150,000 to $250,000 per year over the first 
three years of employing a PCP; losses persist thereafter although 
hospitals can earn profits based on tests and referrals from the 
physician’s practice.65 The willingness to incur substantial losses in 
connection with PCP employment lends support to the conclusion that 
“hospitals are willing to take a loss employing PCPs in order to 
influence the flow of referrals to specialists who use their facilities.”66 
                                                      
63. The litigated antitrust cases are unanimous that referrals within an integrated system are not 
anticompetitive conduct that would support a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., 
Four Corners Nephrology Assocs. v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of Durango, 582 F.3d 1216, 1224 (10th Cir. 
2009); Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995); 
Barry v. Blue Cross of Cal., 805 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1986); Park Ave. Radiology Assocs. v. 
Methodist Health Sys., Inc., No. 98-5668 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 10, 1999). This is consistent with the 
general principle, set out in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004), that a competitor generally has no duty to deal with a rival. See also 
Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1072–76 (10th Cir. 2013) (offering a two-part test 
for determining if a refusal to deal falls into “a ‘limited exception’ to the general rule of firm 
independence”). 
64. Lawton R. Burns & Ralph W. Muller, Hospital-Physician Collaboration: Landscape of 
Economic Integration and Impact on Clinical Integration, 86 MILBANK Q. 375, 390 (2008). This is 
not to suggest that most acquisitions are motivated by an anticompetitive desire to damage rivals. A 
hospital may believe the acquisition of physicians is one way to control costs and so better position 
itself for managed care contracting. As Atul Gawande wrote in an article comparing the very 
different cost of health care in two similar Texas cities, “[t]he most expensive piece of medical 
equipment, as the saying goes, is a doctor’s pen. And, as a rule, hospital executives don’t own the 
pen caps. Doctors do.” Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum: What a Texas Town Can Teach Us 
About Health Care, NEW YORKER (June 1, 2009), www.newyorker.com/reporting/ 
2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande?currentPage=all [https://perma.cc/69UK-LJD6]. A hospital 
that employs physicians may be better able to influence decisions those physicians make that drive 
up hospital costs but over which hospitals have no direct control. A decision unnecessarily to extend 
a hospital stay by one night or to order unneeded tests will not result in additional revenue for a 
hospital reimbursed on a fixed basis according to the patient’s diagnosis, but it will increase the 
hospital’s costs. A hospital also may acquire physicians for defensive reasons—if it doesn’t do so, 
its rivals will, and then it will be on the short end of the splitters’ stick. 
65. Kocher & Sahni, supra note 59, at 1791. For newly hired PCPs to be profitable, they must 
generate at least thirty percent more visits; new specialists must generate twenty-five percent more 
referrals than they do at the outset. Id. at 1790–91. 
66. Id.; see also Beth Kutcher, Making Physicians Pay Off: Hospitals Struggle to Balance 
Current Costs with Future Benefits of Employing Docs, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 22, 2014) 
 
11 - Greaney Ross.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/1/16  1:04 PM 
214 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:199 
 
Hospitals may be willing to sustain unprofitable service components for 
a variety of reasons, e.g., possible benefits flowing from other, related 
services, mitigation of uncertainties about future market and regulatory 
changes, and strategic considerations about rivals’ responses.67 
Nor does the evidence yet support the claim that physician 
employment produces societal benefits, including cost savings or quality 
improvements.68 Many observers assume that such improvements 
inevitably flow from hierarchical structures.69 Not only is economic 
evidence for this proposition lacking so far, some studies suggest that 
hospital-physician integration has raised physician costs, hospital prices, 
and per capita medical spending.70 Recent studies examining the 
relationship between hospital-physician consolidation and performance 
finds hospital ownership of physician practices (as contrasted with 
looser forms of contractual integration) to be associated with higher 
hospital prices and spending.71 For example, one analysis of physician 
                                                      
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140222/MAGAZINE/302229986 
[https://perma.cc/F6D9-DBHW]. 
67. See infra note 107 (discussing cross subsidization of hospital services). 
68. Letter from Acad. Economists to Hon. Janet L. Sanders (July 21, 2014) (on file with 
Washington Law Review) (“[T]here is no convincing evidence to date that combining physicians 
and hospitals under common ownership tends to result in cost savings.”); see also Lawton Robert 
Burns et al., Horizontal and Vertical Integration of Physicians: A Tale of Two Tails, 15 ADVANCES 
HEALTH CARE MGMT. 39 (2013) (“Research on the effect of integration on physician productivity 
and hospital profitability has produced mixed results.” (emphasis in original)).  
69. As Oliver Williamson wrote in The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure 
Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 113–14, “the most distinctive advantage of the firm . . . is 
the wider variety and greater sensitivity of control instruments that are available for enforcing 
intrafirm in comparison with interfirm activities.” Even more succinctly, “fiat is frequently a more 
efficient way to settle minor conflicts . . . than is haggling or litigation.” Id. 
70. See JEFF GOLDSMITH ET AL., NAT’L ACAD. SOC. INS., INTEGRATED DELIVERY NETWORKS: IN 
SEARCH OF BENEFITS AND MARKET EFFECTS (2015) (summarizing literature and analyzing 
performance of fifteen of the largest integrated delivery systems). But see MARGARET E. GUERIN-
CALVERT & JEN A. MAKI, CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE ECON. & POLICY, HOSPITAL REALIGNMENT: 
MERGERS OFFER SIGNIFICANT PATIENT AND COMMUNITY BENEFITS 10 (2014), 
http://fah.org/upload/documents/FTI_Hospital-Realignment-Mergers-Offer-Significant-Patient-and-
Community-Benefits_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/59MX-DYAP] (adding physicians to a system is 
one way to create an integrated delivery system “to deliver a full spectrum of care to a 
community”). 
71. Laurence C. Baker et al., Vertical Integration: Hospital Ownership of Physician Practices Is 
Associated with Higher Prices and Spending, 33 HEALTH AFF. 756 (2014) (noting that increases in 
the market share of hospitals that own physician practices are associated with increases in area 
prices and spending); see also James C. Robinson & Kelly Miller, Total Expenditures in Hospital-
Owned and Physician-Owned Organizations in California, 312 JAMA 1663 (2014), 
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1917439 [https://perma.cc/4NS2-C3SP] (noting 
that groups owned by physicians have lower costs than groups owned by hospitals); Hannah T. 
Naprash et al., Association of Financial Integration Between Physicians and Hospitals with 
Commercial Health Care Prices, JAMA ONLINE FIRST (Oct. 19, 2015), 
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acquisitions by hospitals found that commercial insurers face increases 
of 13.7% in physician prices with the largest increases occurring when 
the acquiring hospital has a larger share of its inpatient market.72 
Moreover, analyses of health system organizations suggest that 
economic integration historically has failed to generate clinical 
integration that results in either cost savings or improved efficiency.73 
These studies lend support to concerns that certain physician 
acquisitions may enhance hospital bargaining power and vertical 
antitrust analysis is warranted. Of course, the historical record of 
integration predates the introduction of important financial incentives by 
health reform and changing private insurance contracting practices. 
Nevertheless, the performance of even highly integrated systems 
establishing accountable care organizations (ACOs) post-ACA suggests 
at best a rather slow and winding path to integration producing 
meaningful improvement in cost and quality.74 
To summarize, there is ample reason for antitrust enforcers to take a 
close look at certain hospital acquisitions of physician practices, as 
excessive consolidation may undermine the cost-saving and quality 
promoting objectives of a market-driven system. However, economic 
evidence about both the risks and benefits of hospital-physician 
                                                      
http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=2463591 [https://perma.cc/M4QT-M469] 
(noting that higher physician-hospital integration associated with increases in outpatient spending, 
driven almost entirely by increases in prices). Some older studies also find hospital-physician 
integration coupled with exclusivity to be associated with increases in prices and little effect on 
efficiency. See Allison Evans Cuellar & Paul J. Gertler, Strategic Integration of Hospitals and 
Physicians, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 1 (2006). 
72. Cory Capps, David Dranove & Christopher Ody, The Effect of Hospital Acquisitions of 
Physician Practices on Prices and Spending (Inst. for Policy Research, Northwestern Univ., 
Working Paper No. 15-02, 2015), http://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/publications/docs/ 
workingpapers/2015/IPR-WP-15-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/78ZK-EA2P]. Notably, the study found 
that only one-quarter of the price increases were due to increased exploitation of reimbursement 
rules, as discussed infra at notes 150–152 and in the accompanying text.  
73. Burns & Muller, supra note 64, at 394. 
74. Only 29 of 114 ACOs participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program in its first year 
achieved savings sufficiently low to earn shared savings. See Brief of Economics Professors as 
Amici Curiae at 12, Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. 
Luke’s), 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-35173), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
cases/140820healthcareeconomistsbrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CPD-WVFP] (noting that the 
proportion of ACOs achieving savings relative to the CMS benchmark was “about what one would 
expect from a random sample of healthcare delivery organizations”). In addition, a significant 
number of the highly sophisticated integrated systems participating in the Pioneer ACO pilot 
withdrew from the program. See From 32 to 19: Three More ACOs Drop Out of Pioneer Program, 
ADVISORY BOARD COMPANY (Sept. 26, 2014, 8:49 AM), https://www.advisory.com/daily-
briefing/2014/09/26/from-32-to-19-three-more-acos-drop-out-of-pioneer-program 
[https://perma.cc/D97K-B55S]. 
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integration is ambiguous, and the legal precedent is limited and does not 
incorporate recent economic analyses. Below we discuss some of the 
more vexing issues likely to be encountered in future litigation. 
II. COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF VERTICAL MERGERS 
A. Foreclosure 
1. General Principles 
As a threshold matter, establishing competitive harm from foreclosure 
requires that the merged parties will deal exclusively with each other or, 
under a raising rival’s cost variant, will give each other preferential 
treatment. While some cases suggest that courts might presume that 
exclusivity or preferential treatment will be the norm after the merger,75 
it is probably incumbent on plaintiffs to present evidence that physicians 
will do so in particular cases. Given ethical norms applicable to 
physicians76 and the laws prohibiting self-referrals,77 courts are likely to 
require some proof that employed physicians will not refer or admit 
patients to other hospitals or refer to physicians associated with rival 
hospitals absent extraordinary circumstances. This does not seem to 
present a major hurdle in most cases. It would be the rare case in which a 
hospital did not expect—and indeed require78—its employed physicians 
to use its facilities and refer to other doctors within its system. 
As to the effects of foreclosure, the modern case law insists on more 
than a showing that rivals will be simply unable to deal with a party to 
the merger with whom they previously dealt. Because foreclosure 
resulting from mergers is merely a “structural” phenomenon, evidence 
                                                      
75. United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (“It is not part 
of the Government’s burden to show actual foreclosure.”); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 28, ¶ 1004b (“A subsidiary will in all probability deal only with its parent . . . .”). 
76. See, e.g., ACP Ethics Manual Sixth Edition, AM. C. PHYSICIANS, www.acponline.org/ 
running_practice/ethics/manual/manual6th.htm#conflict [https://perma.cc/4RMD-MAL5] (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2016) (discussing financial conflicts of interest and stating, “[p]hysicians must be 
conscious of all potential influences, and their actions should be guided by patient best interests and 
appropriate utilization, not by other factors”). 
77. Section 1877 of the Social Security Act, also known as the physician self-referral law and 
commonly referred to as the “Stark Law,” prohibits physicians from referring patients for certain 
designated health services to entities with which they have financial relationships but includes 
specific exceptions, including one for employment relationships. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012). Self-
referrals also may implicate the Anti-Kickback Law and state laws. See generally BARRY R. 
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW (3d ed. 2015). 
78. See supra note 61. 
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that foreclosure will have anticompetitive effects is needed.79 However, 
the cases vary considerably as to what amount of foreclosure is either 
probative of harm or establishes a presumption of harm.80 While there is 
some agreement that foreclosure can have no effect in a competitive 
market,81 there is no consensus as to whether government guidelines 
should adopt a market power threshold.82 
However, the analysis proposed under “raising rivals’ costs” theory 
discussed above supplies an economically sound approach to filling the 
void. Competitive harm can be predicted where a merger narrows the 
market so that rivals or potential entrants have “inadequate access to 
low-cost inputs or insufficient sales potential to support production at an 
efficient scale.”83 Because the ultimate focus of the analysis is the effect 
on competition, one of two prerequisites must be satisfied to show a 
hospital acquisition of a physician practice forces rivals to face higher 
costs: (1) the acquisition must be of such magnitude that rival hospitals 
cannot gain enough access to needed physician services to achieve 
sufficient scale (including levels of quality associated with the number 
and productivity of the physicians acquired), or (2) rival hospitals are 
relegated to higher-cost or lower-quality physician substitutes.84 
2. Foreclosure of PCPs 
As a general matter, allegations that an acquisition of PCPs is 
anticompetitive present a relatively straightforward scenario for applying 
                                                      
79. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 1004a (“[T]he foreclosure theory has serious 
weaknesses . . . even when foreclosure has the effect of making it more difficult for one or more 
existing firms to find inputs or patronage, injury to competition is not obvious and an additional 
explanation must be supplied.”). 
80. Compare Ash Grove Cement Grove v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding 
FTC order of divestiture where shares of the acquiring and the acquired firms in their respective 
“upstream” and “downstream” markets were thirteen to eighteen percent and eighteen percent 
respectively), and Miss. River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1091–93 (8th Cir. 1972) (condemning 
an acquisition involving twenty percent foreclosure), with HTI Health Servs., Inc. v. Quorum Health 
Grp., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (finding a substantial foreclosure in small physician 
specialty markets not anticompetitive), and infra notes 90–97 and accompanying text. See also 
United States v. Microsoft, No. CIV. A. 98–1232, 1998 WL 614485 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998) (noting 
that in the context of exclusive dealing claims, “plaintiffs must establish foreclosure on the order of 
greater than 40 percent to prevail”).  
81. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 1004a (“[F]oreclosure has no anticompetitive 
effect whatsoever in competitive markets and often little effect in oligopolistic markets.”). 
82. Salop & Culley, supra note 16, at 8–10 (discussing suggestions for safe harbors and 
presumptions based on concentration data). 
83. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 1008a. 
84. See id. ¶ 1008b. 
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foreclosure analysis. As noted above, PCPs occupy a pivotal position in 
determining the referral paths for their patients. Moreover, given the 
widespread adoption by public and private payers of reimbursement 
methodologies that pay for a continuum of care through bundled 
payments, capitation, and other methods, the potential for harm from 
cutting off referrals from PCPs is evident. 
Establishing that an acquisition of even a significant number of PCPs 
will harm competition, however, entails proof of several critical 
elements. First, there must be clear evidence that the acquisition 
constitutes a significant proportion of the PCPs available to refer to rival 
hospitals or that reliance on remaining physicians or new entrants will 
significantly raise cost or impair quality of rivals. In some circumstances 
vertical acquisitions merely realign relationships.85 Hence, if the 
employment of some physicians initiates a movement of others to 
realign with rival hospitals, competitive harm is less likely. A second 
requirement, usually easily satisfied, is that the employed physicians are 
likely to change their referral practices so that the acquiring hospital is 
able to garner significant new business for its secondary and tertiary 
services. Third, the harm visited on rival hospitals’ specialty services 
must adversely affect consumers. In this connection, proof of increased 
market power, evidenced by market share statistics and payer testimony 
regarding changes in bargaining leverage, would be important. However, 
because evidence supporting such claims is necessarily speculative in a 
case in which the merger has not been consummated, more compelling 
evidence might be supplied by a raising rivals’ cost analysis. For 
example, proof that the volume of referrals available post-acquisition 
would leave rivals below minimum efficient scale or would increase 
their average costs significantly would be persuasive proof of 
competitive harm.86 Likewise plaintiffs would need to show that the 
costs of obtaining alternative sources of referrals, such as by inducing 
new entry by PCPs in a timely fashion, would make such efforts 
impractical.87 Finally, although rarely—if ever—dispositive in litigated 
horizontal merger cases,88 efficiencies that outweigh competitive harms 
                                                      
85. See id. ¶ 1004c. 
86. A number of related scenarios may also be relevant. For example, fact finders should consider 
the possibility that the remaining physicians in the market might have incentives to raise their prices 
either unilaterally or in coordination with each other. See Salop & Culley, supra note 16, at 16.  
87. See id. (suggesting as relevant evidence the “ability of the targeted downstream rivals to 
substitute to other equally cost-effective input suppliers and the capacity and incentives of those 
input suppliers, including any impact of any reduced input purchases by the downstream division of 
the merged firm”). 
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need to be addressed.89 
The district court’s opinion in HTI Health Services, Inc. v. Quorum 
Health Group, Inc.,90 the lone reported case analyzing a physician-
hospital alliance as a vertical merger, provided a limited account of the 
evidence necessary to show competitive harm. Noting that there was 
“no . . . theoretical basis for evaluating the anticompetitive effects of a 
vertical merger” comparable to the concentration standards applicable to 
horizontal mergers, the court framed the inquiry as an evaluation of 
“structural consequences or economic barriers such as whether the 
merger ‘forecloses’ competitors of the merging entities from a source of 
                                                      
88. The DOJ 1984 “Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines” stated that efficiencies are more 
important in a vertical merger than a horizontal one. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 
26,837 (June 29, 1984) (“The Department will give relatively more weight to expected efficiencies 
in determining whether to challenge a vertical merger than in determining whether to challenge a 
horizontal merger.”). 
89. Although the Ninth Circuit in St. Luke’s questioned the existence of an efficiencies defense, 
FTC officials have continued to state clearly the agency will take claims of efficiencies seriously in 
merger cases. See, e.g., Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines Five Years Later, Remarks at the Ninth Annual Global Antitrust Enforcement 
Symposium, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C., at 11 (Sept. 29, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/805441/ramirez_-
_georgetown_antitrust_enforcement_symposium_9-29-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CPD-PHAW] (“In 
a number of cases, efficiencies have played a role in our decision not to take action against proposed 
mergers.”); Deborah L. Feinstein, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC v. Sysco: 
Old-School Antitrust with Modern Economic Tools, Remarks at GCR Live, at 8 (Sept. 18, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/802381/150918gcrspeech.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8EHW-QL79] (“[S]tudying only litigated cases for guidance on efficiencies 
presents a skewed sample set, given the very high levels of concentration involved in most litigated 
cases. . . . [i]n our investigations prior to litigation, we undertake a careful review of efficiencies 
claims.”); Interview by the Capitol Forum with Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, at the 
ABA’s 2015 Antitrust Spring Meeting (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/ 
files/documents/public_statements/641031/150428capitolforuminterview.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SR8U-PHDS] (“The federal anti-trust agencies . . . wrote the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines . . . I think we will continue to conduct our investigations by doing a very in-depth 
analysis of the efficiencies arguments.”). Director Feinstein made similar comments specifically 
referring to health care mergers after the district court issued its decision in St. Luke’s, saying the 
FTC will “carefully consider evidence that [a] transaction will benefit consumers through improved 
quality, new services and/or decreased costs.” Deborah Feinstein, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care: Proscription, Not Prescription, Address at 
the Fifth National Accountable Care Organization Summit, at 2 (June 19, 2014), 
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/409481/140619_aco_speech.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6S3C-J4TC]. The reality for lawyers is that for the foreseeable future, efficiency 
arguments may have a better reception at the agencies than in the courts. See generally Daniel A. 
Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 363 (2011) (suggesting that while 
“efficiencies arguments are seldom dispositive” at the antitrust enforcement agencies, the agencies 
are “receptive” to them). 
90. 960 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Miss. 1997). 
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supply that would otherwise be open to them.”91 The court announced a 
truncated standard for analysis, accepting plaintiff’s characterization of 
its burden as requiring it to show that “[d]efendants [would] have market 
power in the physician markets and that the hospital market [was] 
sufficiently concentrated such that it [would be] capable of sustaining 
competitive injury.”92 Plaintiff failed to prove market power in physician 
markets, however, because of the likelihood of entry93 and the small size 
of specialty markets.94 The court went on to consider whether plaintiff 
had proven illegality “under the standard analytical framework.”95 
Significantly, plaintiff failed to convince the court that the acquired 
medical clinic would redirect its referrals from plaintiff’s hospital to the 
other hospital in town, which was (indirectly) acquiring the clinic.96 
Physicians at the Vicksburg Clinic testified they left the choice of 
hospital to their patients.97 The court credited this testimony—perhaps 
because the Clinic was located on the Vicksburg Medical Center campus 
and it was much easier for the doctors at the Clinic to see patients there 
than at the acquiring hospital’s facility. In addition, the acquiring 
hospital was Catholic and (as is often the case) some number of patients 
did not want to go to a religiously-affiliated hospital. Finally, the 
Vicksburg Clinic had no plans to move to the acquiring hospital’s 
campus and such a move was not practical in the future. As discussed 
infra in Section III.A, the court went on to find that entry was likely to 
                                                      
91. Id. at 1112 n.4 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962)). 
92. Id. at 1136. 
93. Id. at 1134–35. 
94. In analyzing several specialty markets, the court concluded that where an exceptionally small 
number of physicians constituted the relevant product market in the region, “it simply defies logic to 
imagine that federal law requires this Court to enjoin two urologists from working together in a 
market so small that it might only support two full-time urologists.” Id. at 1129 (quoting Judge 
Posner that doctors in a medical community “too small to support more than a handful of 
physicians” could not be expected to be “set up in competition with each other”). 
95. Id. at 1136. The court listed the relevant factors as follows:  
[T]he nature and economic purpose of the arrangement; the likelihood and size of any market 
foreclosure; the extent of concentration of sellers and buyers in the industry; the capital cost 
required to enter the market; the market share needed by a buyer or seller to achieve a 
profitable level of production or “scale economy”; the existence of a trend toward vertical 
concentration or oligopoly in the industry; and whether the merger will eliminate potential 
competition by one of the merging parties. 
Id.  
96. The court credited testimony from clinic physicians that they left the choice of hospital to 
their patients and that it was easier for the doctors to see some patients at plaintiff’s hospital. In 
addition, it noted that the acquiring hospital was Catholic and some number of patients would prefer 
not to go to a religiously affiliated hospital. Finally, it added that the clinic had no plans to move to 
the acquiring hospital’s campus and such a move was not practical in the future. Id. at 1137. 
97. Id. at 1136. 
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obviate risks of foreclosure. Hence the opinion stops short of the close 
analysis of competitive effect that would be required under 
contemporary economic theories. 
Although the issue was not reached by the district court, the St. Luke’s 
litigation presented an almost paradigmatic illustration of foreclosure 
resulting from physician employment. Rival hospital Saint Alphonsus 
and Treasure Valley Hospital, an independent surgery center, contended 
that St. Luke’s ability to redirect referrals and physician affiliations as a 
result of its acquisition of some eighty percent of the market’s PCPs98 
would “effectively shut out competition” in both the market for general 
acute care hospital services provided to commercially insured patients 
and for facility services for orthopedic and general surgery.99 Relying on 
changes in referral practices by previously acquired PCPs and a wealth 
of internal documents indicating that Saltzer physician referrals to St. 
Luke’s were confidently anticipated,100 Saint Alphonsus claimed it 
would lose some forty percent of its patient volume because of changed 
referral practices by acquired physicians.101 Plaintiffs produced evidence 
that St. Luke’s admitted it planned to further “cripple” a prominent 
employer’s provider network by withdrawing participation of Saltzer 
physicians.102 Further, plaintiffs offered evidence that it would be 
difficult to induce new PCPs to enter the market and in any event it 
would take years for their practices to “ramp up” so as to provide 
referrals to plaintiffs’ facilities.103 
This evidence appears to present a strong prima facie case in line with 
vertical foreclosure precedents. Loss of a significant share of the market 
                                                      
98. The district court calculated the post-merger HHI for PCP services to be 6219 and, as the 
court of appeals noted, St. Luke’s and Saltzer did not challenge that finding on appeal. Saint 
Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 775, 786 
(9th Cir. 2015). 
99. Plaintiffs’ Joint Pre-Trial Memorandum at 30, Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. 
Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), Nos. 12-cv-00560-BLW, 13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 
407446 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015), 
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/130910stlukepretrialmemo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GWV9-PTEQ]. 
100. For example, one Saltzer physician stated that St. Luke’s “declined to allow us autonomy in 
referring patients,” and a consultant for defendants acknowledged “once they are aligned with St. 
Luke’s, there was the expectation that their work would largely . . . go to St. Luke’s.” Id. at 33. 
101. Id. at 30. 
102. Id. at 36. 
103. See Testimony of Dr. Debra Haas-Wilson at 1509, St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446 (Nos. 1:12-
cv-00560-BLW, 1:13-CV-00116-BLW), http://www.ag.idaho.gov/consumerProtection/ 
pendingActions/transcripts/Trial%20Transcript%20-%20Day%209.pdf [https://perma.cc/RA8G-
CS2J] (concluding that it would be “very, very unlikely [a rival physician group] could recruit and 
ramp up to a productive level of practice enough new physicians to replace losses from Saltzer”). 
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to an already dominant rival without alternative means of replacing 
suppliers (i.e., PCPs) would meet the tests traditionally applied in the 
courts. Although not thoroughly analyzed in the parties’ pleadings or 
declarations, evidence in the St. Luke’s case also supported a raising-
rival’s-cost analysis. For example, plaintiff’s expert witness concluded 
that the substantial foreclosure of possible admissions resulting from 
steering by eighty-four percent of formerly independent PCPs and 
eighty-nine percent of formerly independent pediatricians would force 
plaintiff hospital to reduce its output. This reduction would force it to 
incur higher average costs, resulting in higher market prices for general 
acute care hospital services.104 
3. Foreclosure in Specialty Physician Markets 
Claims that the acquisition of a specialty practice has an 
anticompetitive vertical effect will be more difficult to prove than claims 
that an acquisition of PCPs has such an effect. Examination of the 
particular specialty acquired is important and a plausible theory of harm-
to-competition will be critical. 
Certain specialists who practice in a hospital—pathologists, 
radiologists, anesthesiologists, and emergency medicine physicians, for 
example—rarely have their own patient base. These physicians typically 
do not influence where patients go for hospitalization. Some, such as 
pathologists, rarely even see patients. The acquisition by a hospital of a 
group of such hospital-based physicians is unlikely to have any effect on 
rival hospitals or on competition.105 
While it might be possible to conjure a plausible vertical theory where 
the acquisition of other specialists has an anticompetitive effect, cases in 
which the evidence will support such a claim probably will be rare and 
must be carefully thought through. Some specialists perform services in 
hospitals themselves and also refer to other specialists. If one hospital in 
a two-hospital market acquires a group of cardiologists, for example, a 
number of factors must be examined in both the market for cardiology 
                                                      
104. Declaration of Debra Haas-Wilson ¶ 93, St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446 (No. 1:12-CV-00560-
BLW), 2012 WL 9515607. 
105. If a hospital were to acquire a group of hospital-based physicians that provided services to 
two or more hospitals, and were to prevent its newly employed physicians from offering services at 
other hospitals, the rival hospitals might be tempted to consider an antitrust claim (or a claim for 
tortious interference under state law). But, except in unusual circumstances, the likelihood such a 
claim would succeed is remote. In such cases, courts have found that rivals could hire their own 
hospital-based physicians and would look to do so in a regional or even national market. See 
generally Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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services and for services for which the cardiologist makes referrals 
before an anticompetitive effect in the hospital market can be predicted. 
To begin with cardiology services alone, if the acquiring hospital’s rival 
has no cardiology service, the acquisition is unlikely to have an effect on 
hospital competition. If the rival offers inpatient heart services, the scope 
of the possible effect will depend on whether it offers only inpatient 
services performed by cardiologists, or whether it also offers open heart 
surgery, which typically is performed by cardiac surgeons. Cardiologists 
can affect a hospital’s competitive position in two ways: first, by 
admitting their own patients to a hospital for inpatient procedures they 
perform, and second, by referring their patients to a hospital for 
procedures (such as open-heart surgery) they do not perform. The 
acquisition of a group of invasive cardiologists, therefore, could affect a 
rival hospital by depriving it of both the procedures performed by those 
cardiologists and by the referrals for open heart surgery made by those 
cardiologists. Whether either of these effects is anticompetitive will 
depend on an analysis that mirrors the analysis set out above for 
establishing that the acquisition of PCPs is anticompetitive. The analysis 
would begin by establishing the proportion the acquired group accounts 
for of the market for inpatient cardiology procedures and its share of 
referrals for open heart surgery. As with PCPs, a plaintiff then must 
establish that the acquired group previously did a significant amount of 
business with (or referred a significant amount of business to) the 
acquiring hospital’s rival. Finally, a plaintiff must show the loss of this 
business will have an impact on competition and consumers.106 
Whether a plaintiff can make such a showing requires a fact-intensive 
inquiry. To continue with the example in which a hospital acquires a 
group of cardiologists, even if its rival relied heavily on the acquired 
group of cardiologists to supply patients to its heart program, the loss of 
referrals from one specialty group is unlikely to damage the ability of the 
rival hospital to continue in business at all or prevent it from doing so at 
an efficient scale, given the typically broad set of service lines offered 
by most hospitals. When the focus is narrowed to the rival’s heart 
services, it still will be difficult for a plaintiff to establish competitive 
harm. A rival hospital can more easily respond to the loss of referrals to 
                                                      
106. The acquisition will not give the acquiring hospital the ability to set physician fees for these 
services at levels higher than those at which the acquired group could have set physician fees before 
the acquisition. If the group had a monopoly on the provision of professional cardiology services 
before it was acquired, the hospital’s acquisition of the group does not give the hospital any 
additional ability to raise the group’s professional fees. The sole inquiry, therefore, is whether the 
hospital, by reason of the acquisition, has the ability to increase facility fees associated with the 
inpatient procedures performed by the acquired group above pre-existing levels. 
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one service line (here, cardiac services) than it can if it loses referrals 
across all its service lines (as it might if a group of primary care 
providers were to be acquired). In evaluating competitive harm in this 
case, a court would have to assess whether the rival may be able to 
continue offering cardiac services efficiently but with a smaller 
complement of providers in which case there would be no apparent 
consumer injury. A more complicated question arises if the rival chooses 
to continue providing the services even if it is not efficient (perhaps even 
if it is losing money) as may be the case if it believes the service is 
important to its mission.107 In this circumstance, competitive harm would 
arise only if the plaintiff could show that the cost increases resulting 
from reduced scale or other impediments enabled the acquiring hospital 
to charge supra-competitive prices. 
Further, factfinders should be wary of viewing the market through a 
static lens. Beyond simply making the best of it after it loses referrals 
from a group of cardiologists acquired by its competitor, the rival 
hospital for example might be able to respond to the loss of referrals by 
enhancing its relationships with the remaining independent cardiologists 
in the community. The rival might do this by investing in equipment 
important to the delivery of advanced cardiology services, giving 
cardiologists more control over how heart services are delivered in the 
                                                      
107. A decision to offer a money-losing service cannot be made over and over without putting the 
hospital out of business, but it is not uncommon for hospitals to offer some services on which they 
lose money. Some hospitals, especially non-profit and community-based facilities, have long 
complained that some services their communities need, which may include emergency services, 
trauma, or psychiatric care, do not generate enough revenue to cover costs. Some evidence exists 
that some hospitals do provide such money-losing services, at least when they are able to cross-
subsidize those services by offering more lucrative services. Guy David et al., Do Hospitals Cross 
Subsidize? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17300, 2011), http://www.guy-
david.com/pdf/DLHB%2006%202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/BV4D-NAVA]; see also Philip 
Betbeze, The Truth About Cross-Subsidization, HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA (June 2, 2008), 
http://healthleadersmedia.com/content/FIN-212643/The-Truth-About-CrossSubsidization## 
[https://perma.cc/7E6A-R6BB] (“As hospital leaders, you know that you have a multitude of 
money-losing services that you must provide for patients that are either required by law (emergency 
services, for example) or can’t easily be eliminated for a variety of reasons (your commitment to 
improving your community’s health).”); Four Corners Nephrology Assocs. V. Mercy Med. Ctr. Of 
Durango, 582 F.3d 1216, 1224 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that a hospital that hired a nephrologist and 
guaranteed him a salary did not act anticompetitively, despite likelihood “a nephrology practice in 
Durango would operate at a loss for many years,” because without the salary gurantee the 
nephrologist would not relocate to Durango and the community would be underserved). Some 
hospitals may provide a money-losing service simply because they are unable to determine the 
profitability of particular services. Cost accounting at many hospitals is notoriously imprecise. See, 
e.g., Gina Kolata, What Are a Hospital’s Costs? A Utah System Is Trying to Learn, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 7, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/health/what-are-a-hospitals-costs-utah-system-is-
trying-to-learn.html [https://perma.cc/UF39-9SNT]. 
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hospital, and involving cardiologists in leadership roles within the 
hospital.108 The rival also could consider recruiting additional 
cardiologists to the community. In general, it is easier to recruit 
specialists than PCPs: there is a far greater shortage of PCPs in the 
United States than there is of most specialists.109 Ultimately, it is 
possible that far from harming consumers, the acquisition of a single 
specialty group may provoke an “outbreak of competition”110 for 
cardiologists and benefit consumers.111 
Finally, when a specialty group is acquired, the effect of that 
acquisition may need to be measured in a broader geographic market 
than would be the case if an acquisition of primary care providers were 
at issue. Primary care providers typically draw patients from local 
geographic markets.112 Some specialists also may draw from local 
markets, but other specialists draw from much wider geographic areas.113 
If a hospital acquires a group of cardiac surgeons, it is highly likely the 
relevant geographic market will be far broader than it would have been if 
the acquisition of a primary care group were at issue.114 Cardiac 
surgeons may rely on referrals from primary care providers and 
cardiologists scattered across a broad geographic area, who have a 
choice of different cardiac centers to which to refer. In such a situation, 
it is unlikely that an acquisition of a group of cardiac surgeons—even if 
                                                      
108. See generally Sabrina Rodak, 7 Features Cardiologists Look for in Hospital Cardiology 
Service Lines, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Sept. 27, 2012), www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-
key-specialties/7-features-cardiologists-look-for-in-hospital-cardiology-service-lines.html 
[https://perma.cc/57FG-EH4N]. 
109. Physician Supply and Demand Through 2025: Key Findings, AM. ASS’N MED. C. (2015), 
www.aamc.org/download/426260/data/physiciansupplyanddemandthrough2025keyfindings.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/37HM-V7TM].  
110. Brooke Grp. Ltd. V. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 228 (1993). 
111. When a hospital acquires a multi-specialty group, the effect may be similar to when a group 
of primary care physicians is acquired. Different specialists admit patients to different hospital 
departments. If a large multi-specialty group, cutting across many specialties, is acquired, the loss of 
these referrals is more likely to have an effect on competing hospitals (although again, a complete 
review of the market must be undertaken before any conclusions can be reached). 
112. See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 
778 F.3d 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Evidence was presented that insurers generally need local PCPs 
to market a health care plan . . . .”). 
113. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. V. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1411 
(7th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he physicians employed by the Clinic have a large share of the market for 
physician services, since, for primary care anyway (an important qualification—people will go a 
long way for a liver transplant), that market is a local one.”); United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 
707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989), aff’d, 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989). 
114. Morgenstern v. Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291, 1297 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that the market for 
cardiac surgery was broad and probably included surgeons in both Omaha and Lincoln, Nebraska, 
because “patients need travel only fifty-eight miles by main highway” to go from one to the other). 
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it is the only group in a particular city—will have an effect on 
competition. 
Given these differences, lawyers and courts should approach claims 
that the acquisition of a single specialty practice is anticompetitive with 
particular caution. 
B. Potential Competition 
The Agencies have occasionally raised concerns that vertical mergers 
would eliminate potential competition in circumstances in which one of 
the merging parties was the most likely perceived or actual potential 
entrant into the other’s market.115 There are a number of scenarios in 
which physicians are potential entrants into markets that local hospitals 
occupy and vice versa. For example, hospitals and physicians often find 
themselves competing or contemplating entry into ambulatory care 
markets such as surgicenters and ancillary services. In these situations, a 
merger that eliminates a likely or perceived likely entrant and that 
lessens potential competition is cognizable under the Clayton Act, 
although stringent standards of proof apply. 
Predicting competitive harm in such circumstances turns on 
conventional issues raised under actual or perceived potential 
competition analyses. These include the existence of market power in 
the market targeted for entry and whether the presence of the potential 
entrant on the fringe disciplined pricing in the targeted market 
(perceived potential competition). Competitive harm also is problematic 
only if the potential entrant was one of the few firms likely to enter and 
its entry would have improved competitive performance of the 
market.116 These are, to be sure, burdensome requirements, which 
explain why the government rarely relies on potential competition 
analysis and has been rebuffed in court where it has failed to meet the 
                                                      
115. See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Ticketmaster Entm’t, Inc., No. 
1:10-cv-00139 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2010), www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f254500/254544.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TV5X-CJQJ] (suggesting that Ticketmaster and Live Nation were potential 
entrants into each other’s market). The current agency merger guidelines provide little guidance 
regarding potential competition mergers; however, a more detailed discussion is found in the 
Agencies’ 1984 Guidelines. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,834 (June 29, 1984); 
see also United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974). 
116. Older Supreme Court precedent recognized the perceived potential competition theory, but 
the Court has never endorsed actual potential competition analysis. See Marine Bancorporation, 
418 U.S. at 639. See generally Joseph F. Brodley, Potential Competition Under the Merger 
Guidelines, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 376, 383 n.39 (1983); Dannen Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking 
the Potential Competition Doctrine, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1035. 
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exacting standards.117 Nevertheless, given the importance of entry and 
innovation in highly concentrated markets, antitrust enforcers should be 
alert to competitive risks from mergers that eliminate a significant 
source of rivalry in markets for ancillary services or facilities. For 
example, the acquisition by a hospital of a physician practice that was 
considering opening an ambulatory surgical center that would have 
competed with the hospital might give rise to potential competition 
concerns where the hospital’s ambulatory surgery service had market 
power, the physician group was the only actual potential entrant into the 
market, and its entry would have improved competition in the market.118 
The perceived potential competition analysis would apply where the 
hospital was viewed by the owners of the physician surgery center as a 
likely entrant and the center tempered its pricing as a result of that 
perception.119 
Although a litigant’s ability to successfully challenge a hospital’s 
acquisition of a physician practice is highly fact-dependent, certain 
market characteristics may facilitate proof of competitive harm. As a 
general matter, acute care hospital markets are typically highly 
concentrated and the number of physicians capable of operating an 
independent ancillary service in competition with hospitals may be 
limited. Furthermore, given the strong impetus to integrate service 
delivery, the escalating acquisition of physician practices may eliminate 
the limited competition in outpatient facilities in some markets. 
C. Avoidance of Regulation and Similar Strategies 
The DOJ recognized in its 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
that vertical mergers “may be used by monopoly public utilities subject 
to rate regulation as a tool for circumventing that regulation.”120 The 
guidelines provide an example: a regulated utility might acquire a 
supplier of inputs, “sell” the inputs to itself at above market prices, and 
                                                      
117. See, e.g., FTC. V. Steris Corp., No. 1:15 CV 1080 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2015) (refusing to 
issue preliminary injunction where evidence that acquiring firm was likely actual potential entrant 
into duopoly market for contract gamma sterilization services). 
118. Cf. Letter from Mark J. Horoschak, Assistant Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, to Carlos C. Smith & Edward N. Boehm (May 31, 1995) (FTC staff advisory opinion to 
Erlanger Medical Center and Memorial Hospital examining whether joint venture between two 
hospitals to open a new obstetrics hospital where one provided obstetrical services and the other did 
not reduced competition under actual competition analysis and concluding it did not). 
119. Id. (examining the joint venture under perceived competition analysis and finding 
insufficient evidence to challenge the proposed arrangement). 
120. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. at 26,834. 
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then demand the utility’s regulator approve an increase in rates charged 
to consumers on grounds that the utility’s costs have increased.121 The 
Agencies have used the theory on only a few occasions to challenge 
acquisitions by utilities.122 
In states where hospital rates are regulated, the theory could explain 
why a hospital might want to acquire a physician group. If rate 
regulation prevents a hospital from exercising market power, it could 
evade this constraint by acquiring a physician group and raising rates in 
the physician market. But only two states regulate rates today.123 It is 
unlikely, therefore, that evasion of rate regulation explains many 
physician acquisitions or other transactions by hospitals. Recently, 
several health care economists have suggested a twist on the theory that 
may provide a similar motivation for some acquisitions even in states 
without rate regulation. In hearings the Agencies held in early 2015 
examining competition in the health care industry,124 Leemore Dafny, an 
economist and former official at the FTC’s Bureau of Economics, 
suggested that “political restraints” might cause a hospital with market 
power to set rates below profit maximizing levels: 
Suppose in town B, the hospital wants to charge its monopoly 
price, but there’s a mayor who keeps making speeches, or an 
                                                      
121. Areeda and Hovenkamp suggest a similar example: an electric utility that purchases coal to 
fire its generators might justify higher rates by purchasing a coal company and “selling” itself coal 
at inflated rates. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 1013. 
122. See Entergy Corp., 66 Fed. Reg. 9342 (Feb. 7, 2001) (analysis to aid public comment) 
(where the government charged that following the acquisition of a fifty percent interest in a 
pipeline, a regulated energy company might pay inflated transportation costs that could be used to 
justify higher electricity rates); Complaint, United States v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., No. 94-1317 
(D.D.C. June 15, 1994), www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/complaint-judgment-and-injunctive-
relief [https://perma.cc/NE86-CNEV] (the government alleged evasion of rate regulation could 
follow in the wake of British Telecommunications’ acquisition of a minority interest in MCI).  
123. These states are Maryland and West Virginia. See ANNA SOMMERS ET AL., NAT’L INST. FOR 
HEALTH CARE REFORM, ADDRESSING HOSPITAL PRICING LEVERAGE THROUGH REGULATION: 
STATE RATE SETTING, POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 9 (2012), www.nihcr.org/1tl92 
[https://perma.cc/8WUM-HWTW]. Moreover, the FTC recently questioned the effectiveness of the 
West Virginia regulatory system to reign in anticompetitive hospital price increases. In its complaint 
seeking to declare unlawful the proposed merger of the only two hospitals in Huntington, West 
Virginia, the agency alleges the state’s “rate review system would not prevent anticompetitive harm 
from” the merger because the state regulator “principally reviews and approves (or disapproves) a 
hospital’s list prices, or ‘charges,’ as opposed to the prices, or ‘rates,’ negotiated between the 
hospitals and health plans.” Complaint at 3, Cabell Huntington Hosp., Inc., No. 9366 (F.T.C. Nov. 
5, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/151106cabellpart3cmpt.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/KH2L-SBAM]. 
124. Examining Health Care Competition, FED. TRADE COMM’N, www.ftc.gov/news-
events/events-calendar/2015/02/examining-health-care-competition [https://perma.cc/L9YK-2T35] 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2016). 
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attorney general who keeps issuing reports saying that the prices 
are really much too high and you’ve got to do something about 
it. 
Well, one thing you could do is acquire the hospital in A, or 
maybe C, and take your monopoly rents in those markets.125 
According to Dafny, this situation “has come up with some recent 
mergers.”126 
Vistnes and Sarafidis made a similar suggestion in a 2013 article 
analyzing “cross-market” hospital mergers.127 They examined 
circumstances under which hospitals in different geographic markets 
might be able to combine and extract higher prices than the hospitals 
could have obtained without the combination. Traditionally, Vistnes and 
Sarafidis note, the Agencies have been of the view that combining 
hospitals in different geographic markets does not affect bargaining 
leverage or lead to higher prices because competitive circumstances in 
separate markets are different.128 “An exception can arise,” they observe, 
“if one of the hospitals had significant pre-merger bargaining leverage 
that, because of regulation or some other constraint, could not be 
exercised.”129 In such a case, “a cross-market merger might result in 
‘regulatory evasion’ whereby the hospital exercises that bargaining 
leverage in a different market in which the regulatory (or other) 
constraints do not exist.”130 The “other constraint” could be political 
pressure as suggested by Dafny, a desire not to tempt states to introduce 
(or re-introduce) hospital rate regulation,131 or a concern not to provoke 
                                                      
125. Examining Health Care Competition, Panel on Trends in Provider Consolidation, at 93–94 
(Feb. 25, 2015), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/618591/transcript-day2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UW6D-AB9A] (emphasis added). 
126. Id. 
127. Gregory Vistnes & Yianis Sarafidis, Cross-Market Hospital Mergers: A Holistic Approach, 
79 ANTITRUST L.J. 253 (2013). Vistnes, now with an economic consulting firm, previously worked 
at both the Agencies. 
128. Vistnes and Sarafidis question the traditional model, arguing it is possible some cross-
market mergers may increase hospitals’ bargaining leverage and so lead to an increase in prices 
beyond what would have obtained had the merger not occurred. This suggestion is challenged by 
David A. Argue and Scott D. Stein in their article, Cross-Market Health Care Provider Mergers: 
The Next Enforcement Paradigm, 30 ANTITRUST MAG. 25 (2015). The merits of these competing 
arguments are beyond the scope of this Article. 
129. Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 127, at 274 n.69 (emphasis added). 
130. Id. 
131. Eight states regulated rates in some part of the 1970s and 1980s: these were Connecticut, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. 
SOMMERS ET AL., supra note 123, at 2 n.5. “A much larger number relied on voluntary or 
mandatory participation in some form of budgetary review by a nongovernmental association and 
voluntary compliance.” Id. at 8–9. 
11 - Greaney Ross.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/1/16  1:04 PM 
230 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:199 
 
the Internal Revenue Service (or state taxing authorities) to question the 
tax-exempt status of a hospital that raises rates to monopoly levels.132 
It is questionable whether the acquisition by one hospital of another 
hospital or physician group in order to exercise market power that the 
acquirer already possesses, but is reluctant to exercise, is or should be a 
matter of antitrust concern. The United States Supreme Court cast doubt 
on the antecedent question—whether evasion of rate regulation can 
violate the antitrust laws—in Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc.133 New York 
Telephone purchased certain services (involving the removal of 
unneeded switching equipment) from a supplier at inflated prices and 
received a rebate at the end of the year of some of the overcharge.134 The 
inflated prices were used by New York Telephone’s regulator to set 
prices the company charged customers for telephone services. A 
competing supplier, claiming it offered the same removal services for 
less money, asserted New York Telephone paid the inflated prices “as 
part of an attempt to defraud local telephone service customers by 
hoodwinking regulators” and filed an antitrust suit alleging a per se 
unlawful group boycott.135 The Court refused to hold the arrangement 
subject to the per se rule, and in doing so cast doubt on the notion the 
agreement was of any antitrust concern at all. The conduct alleged 
amounted to regulatory fraud136 and “hurt consumers by raising 
telephone service rates.”137 But the injury to consumers “flowed not so 
much from a less competitive market for removal services, as from the 
exercise of market power that is lawfully in the hands of a 
monopolist . . . combined with a deception . . . that prevented the agency 
from controlling New York Telephone’s exercise of its monopoly 
power.”138 
The Court did not consider whether the conduct might make out a 
claim under the rule of reason because the only question presented in the 
                                                      
132. The Internal Revenue Service has issued regulations, effective for tax years beginning after 
December 29, 2015, that detail requirements with which charitable hospitals must comply under 
section 501I of the Internal Revenue Code to avoid fines or loss of tax-exempt status. These include 
requirements that hospitals have financial assistance policies for uninsured patients and that they 
limit the amounts they require patients eligible for such financial assistance to pay. See Additional 
Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 79 Fed. Reg. 78,954 (Dec. 31, 2014) (to be codified at 26 
C.F.R. pts. 1, 53, & 602). 
133. 525 U.S. 128 (1998). 
134. Id. at 131–32. 
135. Id. at 132. 
136. Id. at 137. 
137. Id. at 136. 
138. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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petition for certiorari was the propriety of applying the per se rule.139 
Nonetheless, the Court’s observation that the consumer harm worked by 
the fraudulent scheme was a “lawful” exercise of its market power 
suggests, had the question been presented, the Court would have found 
no violation under the rule of reason either: “cases involving business 
behavior that is improper for various reasons,” the Court admonished, 
should not be transformed “into treble-damages antitrust cases.”140 
If, instead of purchasing services from the supplier, New York 
Telephone had acquired that company, and then raised the internal 
transfer price at which it obtained those services, the result—increased 
prices to consumers and “hoodwinking” of regulators—would have been 
exactly the same. In neither case would consumer harm flow “from a 
less competitive market.”141 It would make little sense to prohibit the 
acquisition of the supplier under Section 7 of the Clayton Act if a 
purchase arrangement with the supplier, producing the same result, is 
beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. Moreover, the “mere possession 
of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices is 
not . . . unlawful.”142 It would be odd to prohibit a merger that does not 
increase market power in any defined market simply because it may 
provide a company a new opportunity to extract a monopoly rent it had 
been reluctant to extract before the merger, though it lawfully could have 
done so.143 
The FTC used a variant on the evasion-of-rate-regulation theory to 
challenge a health care transaction in 2008. Fresenius Medical Care, the 
largest operator of dialysis clinics in the United States, proposed to 
acquire an exclusive sublicense for the manufacture and supply of 
Venofer, a drug used to treat iron-deficiency anemia in dialysis 
patients.144 Medicare reimbursed dialysis clinics for their use of the drug 
                                                      
139. Id. at 140. 
140. Id. at 137. Earlier, in Brooke Group Ltd. V. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 
209, 232 (1993), the Court made a similar point: “[o]nly if . . . higher prices are a product of 
nonmarket forces has competition suffered.” 
141. Nynex Corp., 525 U.S. at 136. 
142. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). 
143. If a firm with market power in one market seeks to leverage that power in a second market, 
it may be engaging in unlawful tying. But it is “superfluous and [an] overdeterrent” to prohibit a 
merger on that basis. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. 
Luke’s), 778 F.3d 775, 787 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, 
¶ 1144a). 
144. Complaint, Fresenius Med. Care AG & Co. KgaA, No. 081-0146 (F.T.C. Sept. 15, 2008), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/09/080915freseniuscmpt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NNN8-JCQS]; Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public 
Comment, Fresenius, No. 081-0146, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/ 
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in an amount equal to the drug manufacturer’s average sale price across 
sales to all users, plus six percent.145 The FTC asserted acquisition of the 
license would allow Fresenius to “artificially inflate its internal costs for 
Venofer.”146 Because Fresenius was a substantial Venofer customer, 
such a price increase would cause the average sales price to rise. This, in 
turn, would force Medicare to pay all users—not just Fresenius—more. 
To resolve the FTC’s concerns, the parties agreed to a consent order 
mandating the Venofer market prices in effect at the time of the 
acquisition be used to report the average sales prices on which Medicare 
pegged reimbursement.147 
In its analysis to aid public comment, under the heading “Competitive 
Effects,” the FTC asserted, “[a]fter the transaction, the competitive 
market will no longer determine the price that Fresenius’s clinics will 
pay for IV iron.”148 The statement is correct, so far as it goes, but does 
not explain how the harm is an antitrust injury. The higher prices the 
FTC feared Medicare might pay would come about purely as a result of 
Medicare’s reimbursement rules. If Medicare wanted to change how it 
reimbursed for the use of Venofer it could do so. In fact, changes in the 
reimbursement system designed to eliminate the reliance on average 
sales prices were underway in 2008—and the FTC provided the consent 
order would expire once those changes were finalized.149 This provision 
in the consent order is an implicit acknowledgement that the acquisition 
did not lessen, or threaten to lessen, competition in any market. 
The St. Luke’s litigation presents another example where proof of 
market power and the oddities of Medicare reimbursement were 
intertwined, but this time the reviewing court may have improperly 
rejected evidence of a price increase as irrelevant to the antitrust 
question when it was highly pertinent. Under the Medicare provider-
based billing rules in effect at the time of the litigation, a hospital could 
                                                      
2008/09/080915freseniusanal.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9VC-9ETK].  
145. Complaint, supra note 144, at 4. 
146. Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co. KgaA, et al., In the Matter of, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/081-0146/232resenius-medical-care-ag-co-kgaa-et-al-
matter [https://perma.cc/EW3R-W67A] (last updated Oct. 21, 2008). 
147. The FTC acknowledged that its concern would disappear in 2014, by which date Medicare 
was required (by the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008) to pay for 
dialysis services, including drugs such as Venofer, with a single, bundled, per patient payment. 
Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, supra note 144, at 3. 
148. Id.  
149. Agreement Containing Consent Order ¶ 10.A, Fresenius, No. 081-0146, 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/09/080915freseniusagrmt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V7RC-F3LM].  
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bill a facility fee, in addition to the professional charge, for procedures 
performed by a physician in a hospital.150 If the same procedure were 
performed in a physician’s office or clinic, Medicare did not pay a 
facility fee. The result was Medicare paid more for certain procedures 
when performed in a hospital than when performed in a physician’s 
office or clinic. This provided a powerful motivation, completely apart 
from a desire to increase market power, for hospitals to acquire 
physician practices.151 If the hospital could license physician offices or 
clinics as part of the hospital (which could be done under certain 
conditions, even if the offices or clinics were physically separate from 
the hospital), then the hospital could charge facility fees for procedures 
performed there and obtain greater reimbursement from Medicare. As a 
result of this peculiarity in Medicare reimbursement, once St. Luke’s 
acquired the Saltzer Medical Group, it expected to obtain better 
reimbursement for certain procedures provided at Saltzer clinics than 
Saltzer was able to obtain as an independent clinic.152 
Many commercial payers pattern their payment methodologies after 
Medicare’s reimbursement methodology and so also pay more for some 
procedures when done in a hospital facility than they would pay if the 
procedures were done in an independent physician’s office or clinic.153 
Apparently, this was the case in Idaho: internal St. Luke’s studies 
                                                      
150. Section 1833(t) of the Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t) (2012)), established the system under which most hospitals are reimbursed 
for services performed in an outpatient department. On November 2, 2015, President Obama signed 
the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA), Pub. L. No 114-74, 129 Stat. 584, into law. Section 603 
of the BBA directs the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), effective January 1, 
2017, not to pay off-campus hospital departments hospital outpatient PPS rates if those departments 
began billing on or after the date the Act was signed into law. Affected off-campus departments will 
be paid according to the (generally lower) Medicare Physician Fee Schedule or Ambulatory 
Surgical Center Payment System. 
151. See, e.g., STATE OF CONN. ATT’Y GEN. GEORGE JEPSEN, REPORT OF THE CONNECTICUT 
ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING HOSPITAL PHYSICIAN PRACTICE ACQUISITIONS AND HOSPITAL-
BASED FACILITY FEES 6 (2014) [hereinafter REPORT OF CONN. ATT’Y GEN.], 
http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/press_releases/2014/20140416_oag_report_hospitalmdacquisitions_hos
pitalbasedfacfee.doc200x.pdf [https://perma.cc/984H-YXN3] (noting that the trend of vertical 
acquisition has a compounding effect for consumers: as more previously independent clinics and 
physicians are acquired by hospitals, more patients are charged hospital facility fees); Kutcher, 
supra note 66. 
152. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), Nos. 12-
CV-00560-BLW, 13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *12 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 
778 F.3d 775, (9th Cir. 2015). 
153. See Scott Baltic, Monopolizing Medicine: Why Hospital Consolidation May Increase 
Healthcare Costs, MED. ECON. (Feb. 24, 2014), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/ 
medical-economics/content/tags/hospital-employment/monopolizing-medicine-why-hospital-
consolidation-?page=full [https://perma.cc/8XMN-B4M6]. 
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showed the health system could expect additional reimbursement from 
commercial payers after the acquisition of Saltzer because those payers, 
following Medicare’s lead, also had contracted to pay facility charges.154 
There was nothing unique about this. Many hospital-physician deals are 
driven by the peculiarities of Medicare’s provider-based billing rules and 
the tendency of commercial payers to follow these rules in their own 
payment systems.155 If St. Luke’s would gain no market power from the 
acquisition of Saltzer, then in the aftermath of the acquisition two things 
would happen: (1) Medicare would pay more for procedures performed 
at Saltzer for which a facility fee could be tacked on once Saltzer 
qualified as a hospital facility, and (2) commercial payers that followed 
Medicare’s reimbursement methodologies would pay more for those 
procedures as well. The FTC appeared to recognize—unlike in the 
Fresenius case—that increased payments by Medicare are not evidence 
of market power.156 The agency argued instead that the increased 
amounts commercial payers would pay in added facility fees were 
evidence of market power.157 The argument was complex. Immediately 
after the Saltzer acquisition, regardless of whether St. Luke’s gained 
additional market power as a result, commercial payers that were bound 
contractually to pay facility fees to St. Luke’s would find themselves 
                                                      
154. St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *12. 
155. The district court, quoting from a study relied on by expert witnesses at trial, noted that 
“physician reimbursement may be higher for services rendered at hospitals than in physicians’ 
offices.” Id. (quoting BERKELEY FORUM, A NEW VISION FOR CALIFORNIA’S HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: 
INTEGRATED CARE WITH ALIGNED FINANCIAL INCENTIVES 53 (2013), 
https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/10509573/a-new-vision-for-californias-healthcare-
system [https://perma.cc/R58X-PZ93]). Many other sources have commented on the incentive 
facility-based reimbursement created for hospitals to acquire physician practices. See, e.g., REPORT 
OF CONN. ATT’Y GEN., supra note 151, at 1–2, 5–7; HEALTHCARE APPRAISERS INC., A REVIEW OF 
RECENT TRENDS AND TRANSACTIONS 21 (2013), www.healthcareappraisers.com/HTYIR_2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/73P5-YHEU]. See generally MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT 
TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 48 (2013), http://medpac.gov/ 
documents/reports/mar13_entirereport.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZ3B-UZ46] (noting the shift from 
physician offices to hospital outpatient departments is “consistent with the financial incentives in 
the current payment system”). 
156. Answering Brief for Plaintiffs/Appellees at 42 n.8, Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. 
St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-35173) 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140813stlukeansweringbrief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TZ33-84LZ] (“St. Luke’s discussion of provider-based billing under 
Medicare . . . is irrelevant because Medicare, unlike the private insurance at issue here, does not 
negotiate reimbursement rates and thus is unaffected by the market power that St. Luke’s gained 
through the acquisition.”).  
157. Id. at 43 (“It is precisely St. Luke’s acquisition of market power in the primary-care market 
that enables it to bargain for increased overall reimbursements that it could not otherwise obtain [in 
the provision of ancillary services].”). 
11 - Greaney Ross.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/1/16  1:04 PM 
2016] NAVIGATING THROUGH THE FOG 235 
 
paying more, simply because St. Luke’s could qualify Saltzer locations 
as part of a hospital and begin to add facility fees to patient bills. But if 
the Saltzer acquisition did not increase St. Luke’s market power in any 
way, then, at the next opportunity to renegotiate, commercial insurers 
would have insisted on eliminating those fees.158 
The FTC argued that internal documents showed St. Luke’s believed 
that once commercial payers paid more as a result of newly charged 
facility fees, “[t]he leverage gained by the Acquisition would give St. 
Luke’s the ability to make these higher rates ‘stick’ in future contract 
negotiations.”159 The district court understood the FTC’s argument and 
relied on it for evidence that St. Luke’s acquisition of Saltzer would 
increase the combined system’s power in the market for PCP services.160 
The Ninth Circuit, while otherwise affirming the district court’s order 
finding the acquisition unlawful, held that “the ancillary services finding 
is not supported by the record.”161 The Ninth Circuit construed the 
district court to have held that St. Luke’s would use leverage acquired 
(through the merger with Saltzer) in the market for PCP services 
improperly to raise prices in the separate market for ancillary services.162 
But the district court made “no findings about St. Luke’s’ market power 
in the ancillary services market.”163 Without such findings, the Ninth 
Circuit declared, “it is difficult to conclude that the merged entity could 
easily demand anticompetitive prices for such services.”164 But that was 
                                                      
158. The FTC argued, and apparently St. Luke’s agreed, that in practice the health system and 
commercial payers did not negotiate line-by-line charges for individual items and services, but 
negotiated “the total amount of money the parties project will be paid for all services covered by the 
contract.” Id. at 42. In this case, an insurer facing a system that had added facility fees to its bill 
without any commensurate increase in market power could insist on removing those fees, or reduce 
amounts paid for other services—but in no case would the insurer permit the health system to 
increase its bottom line reimbursement in the next contract cycle. 
159. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), Nos. 12-
CV-00560-BLW, 13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *12 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014) (relying 
on testimony of the St. Luke’s economist, David Dranove), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015). 
160. Id. at *12, *22; see also Memorandum Decision and Order at 3, St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446 
(“[I]t appears highly likely that health care costs will rise as the combined entity obtains a dominant 
market position that will enable it to (1) negotiate higher reimbursement rates from health insurance 
plans that will be passed on to the consumer, and (2) raise rates for ancillary services (like x-rays) to 
the higher hospital-billing rates.”). 
161. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d 
775, 787 (9th Cir. 2015). The error was harmless according to the court of appeals because the lower 
court’s separate finding that the acquisition would increase power in the market for primary care 
physician services was supported by factual findings. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. The court also observed that a merger should not be found anticompetitive because the 
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not the FTC’s argument. It was the much simpler argument, which the 
trial court had credited, that St. Luke’s internal documents supplied 
evidence that the system believed the acquisition of Saltzer would lead 
to increased power in the primary care market.165 
Unless the nation sees a resurgence of price regulation in health care, 
few hospitals or health systems will acquire a physician practice to avoid 
regulation. But the suggestion, made by Dafny, Vistnes, and Sarafidis—
that health systems acquire facilities outside their geographic markets, 
and raise prices there to exploit the market power they already possess 
but are reluctant to exercise—may provide a motive for some physician 
practice acquisitions. In light of Discon it seems unlikely, however, that 
an acquisition could be enjoined under the antitrust laws on this basis, 
even if this motive could be shown. Any post-merger conduct that 
damaged competition in the second market could be addressed as a tying 
or bundling issue under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, as 
appropriate.166 
Efforts by hospitals or health systems to exploit the labyrinthine 
architecture of the Medicare system provide even less basis to block an 
acquisition of a physician practice. Since the passage of the Bipartisan 
Budget Act167 on November 2, 2015, hospitals no longer may acquire a 
physician clinic, qualify it as provider-based, and add a facility fee to the 
professional fee for procedures performed there.168 But nothing in 
Medicare law prevents hospitals that acquired physician clinics before 
that date from continuing to do so.169 Moreover, as the FTC’s case 
                                                      
newly merged company might be in a position in the future to leverage its market power into a 
second market. Id. (citing AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 1144a, for the proposition that 
it is “superfluous and overdeterrent” to condemn a merger because it may have anticompetitive 
tying effects). 
165. Oral argument shows the Ninth Circuit was quite confused about the issue. Oral Argument at 
42:00, St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775 (No. 14-35173), www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_ 
video.php?pk_vid=0000006760 [https://perma.cc/GUX9-8FQV]. Judge Hurwitz seemed to think a 
facility fee could be charged by Saltzer doctors only if they took their patients to a St. Luke’s 
hospital (which is not the case) or committed “fraud” by performing procedures at Saltzer clinics 
and billing a facility fee. This isn’t fraud at all: so long as the acquired facility qualifies under the 
provider-based billing rules, it is exactly what those rules permit. 
166. The courts have substantial experience applying the Sherman Act to both tying and bundling 
arrangements. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (tying 
anesthesia services to surgical services); Cascade Health Sols. V. PeaceHealth, 542 F.3d 668 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (providing a discounted bundle of primary, secondary, and tertiary services). 
167. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No 114-74, 129 Stat. 584. 
168. Id. § 603, 129 Stat. at 597. 
169. In one litigated case, a Washington superior court held imposition of such facility fees do 
not violate the state’s Consumer Protection Act. Gibson v. Va. Mason Med. Ctr., No. 05-2-02198-
5SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2006) (order granting in part and denying in part defendant’s 
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against Fresenius over its acquisition of a license for Venofer showed, 
there are many ways (some of which undoubtedly have yet to be 
discovered) to game the Medicare system and increase reimbursement. 
Efforts to exploit Medicare rules to increase reimbursement should be 
dealt with, if at all, under that regulatory system and not as antitrust 
matters. 
D. Increased Bargaining Leverage and Reduced Network 
Competition 
Economic analyses of provider mergers have begun to emphasize the 
importance of changes in bargaining leverage as a central measure of the 
potential competitive effects of mergers. Under the “two-stage” model of 
provider competition, providers compete for network inclusion in the 
first stage and for in-network patients in the second stage.170 Under this 
framework, the key locus of price competition for healthcare providers is 
therefore centered on competition among providers for inclusion in 
insurers’ networks. Competition for inclusion in the network occurs 
across a number of dimensions including quality and access, although 
reimbursement rates play a prominent role. Once in the network, 
providers then compete for patients on non-price dimensions like clinical 
quality, wait times, and patient satisfaction. Notably, findings of 
increased bargaining leverage have been a decisive factor in recent 
hospital merger decisions.171 Analysis of hospital-physician mergers 
might likewise incorporate analysis of possible increases in bargaining 
leverage resulting from the combination of complementary services. An 
important empirical question, therefore, would be whether the changed 
position of the parties negotiating managed care contracts is enhanced by 
the combination of the services. For example, the addition of a preferred, 
“must have” physician practice to a hospital with a strong market 
position might make it impossible for an insurer to walk away from the 
combined entity’s “all or nothing” contractual terms.172 Application of 
                                                      
motion for summary judgment). 
170. Cory Capps, David Dranove & Mark Satterthwaite, Competition and Market Power in 
Option Demand Markets, 34 RAND J. ECON. 737 (2003); Robert Town & Greg Vistnes, Hospital 
Competition in HMO Networks, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 733, 733–52 (2001); Greg Vistnes, Hospitals, 
Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 672 (2000). 
171. ProMedica Health Sys. Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); FTC v. OSF Healthcare 
Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1084 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“[T]he proposed merger in this case would give 
the combined entity significant bargaining leverage, which would in turn allow the combined entity 
to extract higher prices from MCOs.”). 
172. See Brief of Amici Curiae Economics Professors in Support of Plaintiffs/Appellees Urging 
Affirmance, St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th 
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this theory would require analysis of insurers’ ability to contract for 
alternative network arrangements and the extent to which the additional 
leverage is created by the combination of market power in physician and 
hospital services.173 
III. MITIGATING FACTORS 
The preceding Part offered a roadmap for evaluating whether the 
effect of a vertical physician/hospital merger may be substantially to 
lessen competition in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. As is 
undoubtedly apparent, the trail is marked by numerous diverging paths 
and cases will turn on specific facts and circumstances unique to every 
market. Even when a plaintiff successfully navigates the course the 
journey is not over, as a host of factors may undercut the claim that a 
particular vertical merger is likely to be anticompetitive. We discuss two 
of the most important factors below: ease of entry and countervailing 
power.174 
                                                      
Cir. 2015) (No. 14-35173) (“From the provider-insurer bargaining model that characterizes the first 
stage of competition, it follows that the total reimbursements paid by an insurer to a provider 
organization will depend on that organization’s combined bargaining leverage across all services it 
supplies to enrollees.”). 
173. Studies indicating that hospital employment of physicians correlates with higher costs and 
prices. See supra notes 69–71 (suggesting that mergers strengthen the bargaining position of the 
combined entity).  
174. In the context of a horizontal merger, the Agencies argue that analysis in “Section 7 claims 
[proceeds] under a burden-shifting framework” under which plaintiff “can establish a presumption 
of liability by . . . showing that the transaction will lead to undue concentration in the relevant 
market.” Polypore Int’l, Inc., 150 F.T.C. 586, 599–600 (2010), aff’d, 686 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 
2012). Once the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to defendants to “produce evidence showing that 
the plaintiff’s evidence paints an inaccurate picture of the merger’s likely competitive effects.” Id. 
This is the so-called “Philadelphia National Bank” presumption, originating in the Supreme Court’s 
holding that once a plaintiff in a horizontal merger case has shown the merger will result in “a firm 
controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and result[] in a significant increase in 
the concentration of firms in that market,” the burden shifts to defendants to come forward with 
evidence that mitigates the claim of anticompetitive harm. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 
U.S. 321, 363 (1963). Though the burden of production may shift, at all times the burden of 
persuasion remains on the plaintiff. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982–83 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990). To be precise, therefore, in a horizontal merger case, ease of entry and other factors on 
which defendants may wish to introduce evidence are not “defenses” but represent avenues a 
defendant may take to undercut or vitiate the notion that the market shares and structure in a 
particular case necessarily lead to a finding of market power. The “Philadelphia National Bank” 
presumption is explored at length in a series of essays prepared for a symposium held at New York 
University School of Law on the occasion of the decision’s fiftieth anniversary. The papers are 
published in 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 189 (2015). In a vertical merger, where no similar market structure 
presumption applies, it is even clearer that the burden of persuasion that the merger is 
anticompetitive rests at all times on the plaintiff. 
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A. Ease of Entry 
Ease of entry has been held to trump inferences of market power from 
concentration data in a number of antitrust cases.175 Following 
significant setbacks in litigation,176 the DOJ, joined for the first time by 
the FTC, issued extensively revised Merger Guidelines in 1992 to clarify 
the standards deemed necessary to merit obviating other indicia of the 
potential exercise of market power.177 Supported by economic analysis 
of strategic considerations guiding entry decisions and efficacy,178 the 
Agencies adopted a tri-partite formula for evaluating entry in merger 
cases: entry need be “timely, likely, and sufficient” to assure that a 
market would perform competitively despite high concentration 
resulting from a merger.179 “Timeliness” was set, somewhat arbitrarily, 
at two years, presumably based on the premise that predictions of longer 
term entry are speculative and that the Clayton Act should not condone 
extended periods of harm to consumers. A finding of “likelihood” would 
depend on evaluation of sunk expenditures, scale of entry, and post-entry 
prices. “Sufficiency” turns on the closeness of potential substitutes in 
differentiated products, limitations on entrants’ capabilities or 
reputation, and entry at the “scale and strength of one of the merging 
firms” in order to replace the lost competition from the acquisition.180 
The revised guidelines have been successful in clarifying the standard to 
be applied and a number of courts have adopted the framework.181 At the 
                                                      
175. As the Agencies explain in the current Horizontal Merger Guidelines, a “merger is not likely 
to enhance market power if entry into the market is so easy that the merged firm and its remaining 
rivals in the market, either unilaterally or collectively, could not profitably raise price or otherwise 
reduce competition compared to the level that would prevail in the absence of the merger.” 2010 
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 44, § 9.  
176. United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990); Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 
981; United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 983–84 (2d Cir. 1984). 
177. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
(1992), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/hmg.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/B8NB-SFZ6].  
178. Professor Jonathan Baker summarizes the strategic approach to understanding entry as 
follows: “if entry requires sunk expenditures (irreversible investments), and incumbents would be 
expected to react quickly to cut price in response to entry, entry may be deterred even if the pre-
entry price exceeds competitive levels. This may occur because the prospective entrant, recognizing 
the prospect of post-entry competition, will not expect to earn a contribution margin (revenues less 
variable costs) adequate to cover its own sunk costs.” Jonathan B. Baker, Responding to 
Developments in Economics and the Courts: Entry in the Merger Guidelines, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 
189, 194 (2003). 
179. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 44, § 9.  
180. Id. 
181. Baker, supra note 178, at 201–02. 
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same time, critics have noted that applying the principles is hardly a 
straightforward task, particularly with regard to likelihood182 and factors 
such as “minimum viable scale” and “sales opportunity,” which, 
although seemingly precise, prove elusive in litigation.183 
The two reported cases dealing with ease of entry in the context of 
physician mergers reached different conclusions. In HTI Health 
Services, Inc. v. Quorum Health Group, Inc.,184 the district court rejected 
a private plaintiff’s challenge to a merger despite finding that the 
acquisition would result in the acquiring hospital attaining what it 
conceded were “staggering” market shares in several distinct product 
markets: eighty percent PCP services; one hundred percent in general 
surgery and urology; and sixty-seven percent in otolaryngology.185 
Notwithstanding these very large post-merger market shares, the court 
upheld the merger because it believed that entry barriers into the primary 
care market were not significant and that the rival hospital would not 
face obstacles in recruiting physicians.186 As to specialty practices, the 
court found that “if there is any arguable monopoly here at all, it is a 
‘natural monopoly.’”187 
The HTI Health Services court relied on a variety of factors to reach 
its conclusion regarding entry barriers. First, it concluded that the 
primary care market had “not reached the point of saturation” and there 
was “high demand” for these services.188 While acknowledging 
testimony of a physician recruiter who described problems that he 
encountered recruiting physicians to Vicksburg, in particular, and to 
Mississippi, in general, based in part on “negative perceptions and 
stereotypes about Mississippi,” the court also noted past successes in 
                                                      
182. An FTC Commissioner suggested that likelihood decisions should be guided by evidence of 
the history or nonhistory of entry and whether “special circumstances” limit the predictive value of 
history. See Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70 
ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 121 n.70 (2002). As many have pointed out however, the absence of entry can 
be indicative of competitive market conditions rather than entry barriers, and past entry may reflect 
monopolistic pricing. Janusz A. Ordover & Daniel M. Wall, Proving Entry Barriers: A Practical 
Guide to the Economics of New Entry, ANTITRUST, Winter 1988, at 12, 13.  
183. Baker, supra note 178, at 204. 
184. 960 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 (S.D. Miss. 1997). 
185. Id. (“At first blush, the market share percentages in this case, which range from 67% to 
100%, are staggering.”). 
186. Id. at 1135. 
187. Id. at 1128 (citing Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 
1406, 1412 (7th Cir. 1995)) (stating that employing all twelve physicians “might be considered a 
‘natural monopolist’ . . . because the market is too small to support more than a single firm”). 
188. Id. at 1134. 
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recruiting PCPs.189 As to the timeliness of entry, it observed that 
hospitals in the area often guarantee the income of new physicians and 
seemed to conclude that, given exigent circumstances, financial 
inducements would hasten entry.190 While not explicitly invoking ease of 
entry with respect to specialty service markets, the court noted that 
actual and potential competition from nearby surgeons outside the 
geographic market might act as a “competitive check” on the exercise of 
market power.191 
By contrast, the St. Luke’s district court’s application of the Merger 
Guidelines standard—framing the question as whether entry would 
prove “timely, likely, and sufficient in its magnitude, character and 
scope to deter or counteract the competitive effects” of the proposed 
transaction—found the entry defense wanting.192 Its application of the 
standard rested primarily on three factual findings: the disinclination of 
young doctors to live in the relevant market, past difficulties in 
recruiting physicians, and the time required for newly minted physicians 
to “ramp up” in practice and earn a reputation sufficient to compete with 
established practices.193 These findings, the court concluded, 
“demonstrated how difficult it is to recruit primary care physicians into 
[the relevant market], and how difficult it is for new primary care 
physicians to open an office, hire staff, earn a reputation, and develop a 
practice with the quality to compete with St. Luke’s/Saltzer.”194 The 
court concluded St. Luke’s had not carried its burden of proving that 
entry was likely and would be timely.195 
Much evidence, albeit not specifically cited by the court, underlies 
these findings. For example, hospital plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Haas-Wilson 
closely examined the trajectory of primary care practice experience and 
concluded that even if new physicians were to enter the market, it would 
likely take two or more years to ramp up to average levels of 
                                                      
189. Id. at 1135. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 1130. 
192. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), Nos. 12-
CV-00560-BLW, 13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *19, *23 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014) 
(citing 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 44, § 9), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015). The 
district court’s holding on entry issues was not contested on appeal. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr-
Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), 778 F.3d at 786. 
193. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 791. Expert testimony detailed the delays inherent in “ramping up” a 
new practice. 
194. St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446, at *22. 
195. Id. at *23. 
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productivity.196 To reach this conclusion, she examined the productivity 
ramp up of eight full-time physicians newly hired by the Saltzer group. 
In their first two years, newly hired physicians were below the twenty-
fifth percentile of productivity, benchmarked against other PCPs in the 
region.197 In addition, Dr. Haas-Wilson cited studies of patient loyalty198 
and concluded that patients’ reluctance to change physicians “made it 
difficult for new entrants to ramp up their practices” and difficult for 
incumbents “to grow their practices by recruiting new physicians from 
outside the market.”199 
Notably, the district court did not address the sufficiency of entry. In 
this connection, the parties had sparred over the extent and scope of 
entry. Defendant’s expert argued that “the entire Saltzer practice need 
not be replicated by entry or expansion,”200 while plaintiffs responded 
that high fixed costs of entry and the need to establish reputation 
undermined contentions that entrants would replace the lost competition 
resulting from the acquisition.201 The court’s reluctance to address the 
issue is not surprising and probably reflects the inherent uncertainty 
surrounding the many issues that would inform a judgment as to whether 
a prospective entrant would ultimately make a difference. Hence, courts 
are more likely to turn to the somewhat more tractable questions of 
timeliness and likelihood of entry. 
In sum, the case law and Merger Guidelines require accumulating 
considerable evidence about the resources and capabilities required to 
effectively replace an acquired physician practice and the conditions that 
might impair effective competition. Entry analysis in decided cases has 
focused on likelihood and timeliness: courts understandably tend to shy 
away from the even more speculative enterprise of evaluating 
sufficiency of yet-to-be specified entrants. Data on physician shortages, 
medical school enrollments, and education subsidies can give courts 
useful information. Finding probative evidence on the willingness of 
physicians to locate in geographic areas or affiliate with specific 
hospitals necessarily involves a mixture of opinion evidence from 
                                                      
196. Declaration of Debra Haas-Wilson, supra note 104, ¶ 79. 
197. Id. ¶ 128. 
198. See Scott MacStravic, Patient Loyalty to Physicians: Attitudes and Behavior, 10 J. HOSP. 
MARKETING 51, 51 (1995) (defining patient loyalty as the “tendency to use the same physician 
consistently,” and the “willingness to overcome barriers to go to one’s preferred physician”). 
199. Declaration of Debra Haas-Wilson, supra note 104, ¶ 54. 
200. Declaration of David A. Argue ¶ 69, St. Luke’s, 2014 WL 407446 (Nos. 12-cv-00560-CWD, 
13-CV-00116-BLW). 
201. Answering Brief for Plaintiffs/Appellees, supra note 156, at 25. 
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credible sources, such as physician recruitment experts, and of past 
experience in a given market. However, the latter illustrates a key 
problem in entry analysis in all antitrust cases that is even more starkly 
apparent in evaluating health care mergers: what weight should courts 
assign to historical evidence? One must question how much light past 
experience sheds on the evidentiary issues raised in entry analysis given 
the tumultuous changes in delivery and payment currently underway.202 
Next we examine several of the factual issues relevant to entry 
analysis that are likely to arise in the foreclosure scenarios described 
above. In analyzing the effect of potential entry on the competitive 
effects of a hospital-physician merger, the central focus will be on 
evaluating whether rival hospitals that are subject to risk of foreclosure 
have the capability to recruit and support replacement physicians and 
whether that recruitment will make a difference. As discussed above, 
many issues raised regarding the likelihood of recruiting primary care 
physicians, as explored in the St. Luke’s case, are market specific—e.g., 
the attractiveness of the local market, the history of past recruitment 
efforts, and overall demand conditions. Also relevant are data on the 
supply conditions. That is, do shortages of entry-level physicians in 
particular specialty markets and especially in family practice service 
markets make recruitment especially difficult?203 In this connection, 
courts need to gather evidence probative of future supply conditions, as 
the dynamic conditions of health delivery may make reliance on 
historical patterns problematic. As to the timeliness and sufficiency of 
entry, a careful examination of the obstacles new physicians face to 
build their practices will be required. In the context of an acquisition of 
specialist physicians, a key issue will be whether the loss of specialists 
so disrupts rival hospitals’ referrals as to place extraordinary constraints 
on keeping their departments operating even for a short time. 
Uncertainty as to viability of the department and the need to recruit and 
train physicians rapidly may reduce the chances that entry will be timely 
                                                      
202. Compare FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 56 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting that the 
“history of entry into the relevant market is a central factor in assessing the likelihood of entry in the 
future”), and 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 44, § 9 (“Recent examples of entry, whether 
successful or unsuccessful, generally provide the starting point for identifying the elements of 
practical entry efforts.”), with Ordover & Wall, supra note 182, at 13 (questioning reliability of 
historical evidence of entry or non-entry). 
203. See, e.g., Physician Supply and Demand Through 2025: Key Findings, supra note 109 
(estimating total shortfall of physicians between 12,500 and 31,000 primary care physicians and 
38,300 and 63,700 non-primary care physicians); IHS INC., THE COMPLEXITIES OF PHYSICIAN 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND: PROJECTIONS FROM 2013 TO 2025 (2015), www.aamc.org/ 
download/426242/data/ihsreportdownload.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3LU-WY59]. 
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or sufficient. Also complicating the analysis is the rapid change 
underway in payment and delivery. For example, strong market 
pressures to integrate delivery, e.g., through the formation of 
accountable care organizations, may change the minimum scale needed 
to provide specialty services at the hospital.204 Finally, the acquisition of 
a multispecialty group may raise special issues in the context of entry 
analysis. For example, the acquisition of a “must have” physician group 
might chill the willingness of physicians to enter the market.205 In 
addition, the need to replace physicians quickly in multiple specialties 
may increase the costs of recruitment. Finally, given integration into 
larger systems, is the market creating bigger, new “natural 
monopolies”?206 
B. The Power Buyer Factor 
In evaluating a merger of sellers of a product or services, courts may 
take into account the size, sophistication, and bargaining leverage of 
buyers in their markets. Typically such phenomena are considered 
“mitigating factors” that reduce concerns based on concentration data. 
With respect to mergers in oligopolistic markets, the analysis holds that 
successful collusion among sellers is less likely when purchases are 
“lumpy” and when buyers are large and sophisticated because sellers 
have greater incentive to “cheat” on any collusive arrangement to obtain 
a significant piece of business.207 Another premise, likely applicable in 
                                                      
204. See Jeff Goldsmith, Accountable Care Organizations: The Case for Flexible Partnerships 
Between Health Plans and Providers, 30 HEALTH AFF. 32, 35 (2011) (describing pressures in ACOs 
to redistribute income from high earning specialists). 
205. Courts have recognized that consumers may highly value certain providers so that the 
inclusion of those providers in an insurer’s network is vital to the marketability of the insurer’s 
health plans. For example, in the St. Luke’s case, the district court found that the largest health plan 
in Idaho, Blue Cross of Idaho, considered the acquired physician group “to be a must have provider 
for Blue Cross” in the relevant market. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health 
Sys., Ltd. (St. Luke’s), Nos. 12-CV-00560-BLW, 13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *9 (D. 
Idaho Jan. 24, 2014). 
206. Judge Posner concluded that a medical community was “too small to support more than a 
handful of physicians”: 
If an entire county has only 12 physicians, one can hardly expect or want them to set up in 
competition with each other. We live in the age of technology and specialization in medical 
services. Physicians practice in groups, in alliances, in networks, utilizing expensive equipment 
and support. Twelve physicians competing in a county would be competing to provide horse-
and-buggy medicine. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1412 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(emphasis added). 
207. See Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1391 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[C]oncentration of 
the buying side . . . does inhibit collusion. The bigger a buyer is, the more easily and lucratively a 
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vertical foreclosure cases, is that large buyers are better equipped to 
monitor price and quality in the sellers’ market and use their leverage to 
negotiate more favorable terms. The potential exercise of 
“countervailing power” by large buyers (insurance companies and 
employers) might mitigate the risks of supracompetitive pricing by 
vertically integrated hospitals. 
The Agencies offer a rather constrained acceptance of the power 
buyer factor, framing the issue as follows: 
The Agencies consider the possibility that powerful buyers may 
constrain the ability of the merging parties to raise prices. This 
can occur, for example, if powerful buyers have the ability and 
incentive to vertically integrate upstream or sponsor entry, or if 
the conduct or presence of large buyers undermines coordinated 
effects. However, the Agencies do not presume that the presence 
of powerful buyers alone forestalls adverse competitive effects 
flowing from the merger. Even buyers that can negotiate 
favorable terms may be harmed by an increase in market power. 
The Agencies examine the choices available to powerful buyers 
and how those choices likely would change due to the merger. 
Normally, a merger that eliminates a supplier whose presence 
contributed significantly to a buyer’s negotiating leverage will 
harm that buyer.208 
The Agencies also have expressed considerable skepticism about the 
relevance of large buyers in speeches,209 litigation,210 and in their “Dose 
of Competition” report.211 At the same time the DOJ occasionally has 
passed on highly concentrative mergers based in part on its analysis of 
                                                      
member of the cartel can cheat on his fellows; for with a single transaction, he may be able to 
increase his sales and hence profits dramatically.”). 
208. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 44, § 8. 
209. See, e.g., KEVIN J. ARQUIT, FED. TRADE COMM’N, GROUP BUYING AND ANTITRUST (1992) 
(expressing opinion that the “power buyer defense” is not applicable in hospital merger cases); 
STEVEN C. SUNSHINE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MARKET-BASED REFORMS OF HEALTH CARE 
DELIVERY: WHERE DOES ANTITRUST FIT IN? (1995) (“[W]e often hear from merging parties that 
the transaction is needed to balance the hospital’s power against the growing power of managed 
care. We typically don’t credit arguments of countervailing power. We are skeptical that 
monopsony power wielded by managed care providers is likely to have serious welfare effects since 
demand for in-patient service may be quite inelastic.”); Mary Lou Steptoe, The Power-Buyer 
Defense in Merger Cases, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 493 (1993) (where the author, the Deputy Director of 
the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, argued that the power buyer doctrine “would now profit from a 
period of pause and reflection”). 
210. See, e.g., United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
211. IMPROVING HEALTH CARE, supra note 57, at 1, 21. 
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offsetting buyer power.212 
While a number of cases cite the presence of powerful or 
sophisticated buyers as a factor reducing the likelihood that the merging 
parties will exercise market power,213 the phenomenon has not by itself 
been decisive in rebutting the presumption of illegality based on 
concentration and market share data.214 Courts rarely explain the basis 
for concluding that the risk of competitive harm is lessened other than to 
note that buyers negotiate with multiple bidders or have monitored 
changes in price in the past.215 Another consideration that is seldom 
invoked is the question of whether there are small buyers who are unable 
to negotiate favorable prices. In such circumstances the small buyer can 
be the victim of price discrimination, which in turn can increase the 
market power of the power buyer.216 In addition, courts do not always 
distinguish between the rationales based on the sophistication of the 
large buyer and monopsony power. The Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise 
argues persuasively that the former should rarely affect the competitive 
analysis because merger analysis presumes “ordinary knowledge and 
sophistication”—which is usually present in markets for intermediate 
services such as insurance—and the difficulty in calculating degrees of 
                                                      
212. The Antitrust Division explained its decision not to challenge Whirlpool Corporation’s 
acquisition of Maytag Corporation, noting that “the large retailers through which the majority of 
[the merging parties] appliances are sold—Sears, Lowe’s, The Home Depot and Best Buy—have 
alternatives available to help them resist an attempt by the merged entity to raise prices.” Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Antitrust Division Statement on the Closing of 
Its Investigation of Whirlpool’s Acquisition of Maytag (Mar. 29, 2006), 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/2006/215326.htm [https://perma.cc/RK27-
AS4X]; Steven Pearlstein, Arguments for Whirlpool-Maytag Merger Don’t Wash, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 22, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/21/ 
AR2006022101670.html [https://perma.cc/HF7X-GCBN] (noting that the existence of large buyers 
weighed on the decision to allow the merger to go forward). 
213. See, e.g., Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (citing existence of large and sophisticated 
buyers as one factor reducing risk of competitive harm); United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 
754 F. Supp. 669, 675 (D. Minn. 1990) (noting that the merger of dairies was less likely to harm 
consumers because the food distributor market was even more concentrated). But cf. Chi. Bridge & 
Iron Co. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that despite the presence of large buyers, the 
court doubted that the new entry would obviate competitive risks). In several non-merger cases 
buyer power has been a significant factor in the court’s analysis.  
214. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 943c (stating that “very few or perhaps no cases 
have turned on” the sophistication or power of buyers). 
215. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. at 673 (noting that purchasers were “sensitive to and 
monitor changes in fluid milk prices”). 
216. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 943b (“[A] common consequence of large-
buyer bargaining pressure is likely to be recurrent and more or less systematic price discrimination 
in which large buyers obtain lower prices than smaller buyers, but adverse price effects on small 
buyers alone is sufficient to invoke § 7’s prohibitions.”). 
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sophistication.217 Even if there are no small, vulnerable customers, the 
Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise recommends that courts and enforcement 
agencies ignore buyer power as a mitigating factor in a merger of sellers 
unless the circumstances are exceptional.218 The treatise justifies this 
view on intractable measurement problems and notes “powerful buyers 
might find it more profitable to share in their suppliers’ excess profits 
rather than trying to get supply prices down to competitive levels.”219 
Several courts have considered the countervailing power of payers 
and managers of employer health plans in evaluating horizontal hospital 
mergers. In FTC v. Freeman Hospital,220 for example, the district court 
was impressed with the sophistication of HMOs, insurers, and large 
employers. In FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp.,221 the Eighth Circuit 
observed (albeit with disapproval) the growing influence of managed 
care in the market. Other courts examining hospital mergers have 
questioned the significance of an insurer’s countervailing power.222 
Notably, the former group of cases neglected to consider whether 
smaller, less sophisticated hospitals would be harmed and as a result the 
merger would force higher prices to them.223 Most recently, a court 
found the preference of consumers for choice of area hospitals and the 
increased bargaining leverage resulting from the merger negated the 
possibility of large managed care organizations exercising 
                                                      
217. Id. ¶ 943a, at 249. 
218. Id. ¶ 943b, at 253 (“We conclude that it would be inappropriate to give formal recognition to 
buyer concentration and related factors in the ordinary run of merger cases.”).  
219. Id.  
220. 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo.), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995). 
221. 186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding the lower court should have considered 
reductions in quality caused by managed care purchasers of hospital services and quoting Judge 
Posner’s dictum in Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 
1406, 1410 (7th Cir. 1995), that “the HMO’s incentive is to keep you healthy if it can but if you get 
very sick, and are unlikely to recover to a healthy state involving few medical expenses, to let you 
die as quickly and cheaply as possible”). 
222. The district court in FTC v. Universal Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 1991), 
questioned whether despite their size, large insurers could resist consumer demand for inclusion of 
certain hospitals in their networks:  
The insurance companies in this market, however, are not truly large buyers; rather, they are 
third-party payors acting on behalf of individuals, the ultimate consumers. These insurance 
companies, as a practical matter, could not refuse to reimburse their subscribers because the 
prices in the relevant market were too high; rather, they would, as always, reimburse their 
subscribers for necessary medical services and, if the prices remained high, they would pass 
these increased costs on to the individual consumers. 
223. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 943c (questioning the application of power buyer 
analysis in Freeman and concluding that “conclusion[s] about large health insurer buyers should 
mitigate in favor of legality only if it could additionally be shown that the hospital is unable to 
price-discriminate against smaller buyers”). 
11 - Greaney Ross.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/1/16  1:04 PM 
248 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:199 
 
countervailing power.224 In In re ProMedica Health System, Inc.,225 the 
FTC closely analyzed the relative bargaining leverage of the insurers and 
the merging hospitals using econometric analysis of willingness-to-pay 
and other indicia of consumer preferences and concluded that the 
balance would tip decisively in favor of the hospitals.226 
Scholars who, contrary to the position taken by the Areeda-
Hovenkamp treatise, advocate a closer look at the effect of power 
buyers, suggest that courts should attempt to distinguish situations in 
which buyers may exercise “countervailing power” to counteract seller 
monopolies or oligopolies from the case of monopsony.227 Given 
economic studies suggesting that insurers with market power tend to pay 
lower prices to hospitals, the approach recommended would be to 
closely examine the likelihood that price concessions would occur and 
whether they would benefit consumers.228 By this analysis, fact finders 
would need to unpack several distinct issues: (1) whether price 
concessions result from “countervailing power”—the bargaining 
pressures applied to hospitals with market power under threat of 
exclusion from the insurer’s network, or instead are the result of the 
insurer’s exercise of monopsony power;229 (2) whether the exercise of 
                                                      
224. FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1084 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“Given the 
current norms and expectations of Rockford area consumers, the proposed merger in this case would 
give the combined entity significant bargaining leverage, which would in turn allow the combined 
entity to extract higher prices from MCOs.”). 
225. No. 101-0167 (F.T.C. Mar. 28, 2012), aff’d, ProMedica Health Sys. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559 
(6th Cir. 2014). 
226. Id. (citing economic evidence that commercially-insured patients placed 28% more value on 
having in-network access to the dominant merging hospital than on having in-network access to its 
remaining rival and the merger had increased by fifty-eight percent the value that commercially-
insured patients place on having in-network access to the merged entity). 
227. John Kirkwood argues: 
[I]f . . . there are relatively few input suppliers, each with significant market power and each 
with a constant or downward-sloping marginal cost curve, the buyer could not exert 
monopsony power but may be able to exert countervailing power, with procompetitive 
consequences. If a substantial buyer can wield countervailing power against monopolistic, 
oligopolistic, or monopolistically competitive suppliers, it can force their prices closer to the 
competitive level and benefit both efficiency and consumer welfare. 
John B. Kirkwood, Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1485, 1500–01 
(2012). 
228. See, e.g., Glenn A. Melnick et al., The Increased Concentration of Health Plan Markets Can 
Benefit Consumers Through Lower Hospital Prices, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1728 (2011); Asako S. 
Moriya et al., Hospital Prices and Market Structure in the Hospital and Insurance Industries, 5 
HEALTH ECON. POL’Y & L. 459 (2010).  
229. John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Healthcare Prices, 91 WASH. L. REV. 253, 261 n.34 
(2016) (defining monopsony power as “the kind of power that a dominant buyer exerts against 
small, competitive suppliers” while countervailing power “is the kind of power that a substantial 
buyer exercises against suppliers with market power” and explaining the difference “is significant” 
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countervailing power will result in consumer harm notwithstanding its 
tendency to lower provider prices; and (3) whether savings caused by 
countervailing power will be passed on to consumers.230 
This rather complex analytic route is driven by the fact that consumer 
harm may result under both the “countervailing power” and monopsony 
scenarios. There is little question that the exercise of monopsony power 
visits harm on consumers. Artificially low prices decrease the welfare of 
upstream suppliers and generally reduce consumer welfare.231 However, 
in a variety of “countervailing power” situations, consumer welfare may 
also be harmed. For example, the merged firm may coerce or induce its 
suppliers to raise the costs of its remaining rivals, enabling the merged 
firm to increase prices in downstream markets, or may extract price cuts 
from suppliers that induce them to increase prices to other buyers, thus 
allowing the merged firm to raise its own prices.232 Even if downstream 
prices fall as the merged firm takes share from its smaller rivals, their 
destruction may deprive consumers of choices they preferred and 
depress overall consumer welfare. Further, the merged firm may take 
advantage of its preferred cost status to enjoy the “quiet life” and 
become less efficient and innovative.233 
One additional complication: it may be difficult to predict whether 
countervailing power will actually be exercised or will be successful. 
The merging parties and a large supplier have ample incentives to divide 
monopoly profits available in their markets.234 Experience with 
                                                      
because monopsony power is “generally harmful, and countervailing power usually—but not 
always—[is] beneficial”). 
230. For example, Professor Kirkwood has suggested that antitrust reviews of mergers of 
insurance companies should turn on a careful factual inquiry as to whether the provider and 
insurance markets are competitive. Insurer buyer power, he argues, will harm consumers where it 
enables the insurer to pay low prices to “small, powerless providers” or where the cost savings from 
bargaining (i.e., the “countervailing power” scenario) are not passed on to consumers because of the 
insurer’s excessive market power. Id. at 279. 
231. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 297, 339 (1991) (“[L]ower input prices resulting from the exercise of monopsony 
power do not ultimately translate into lower prices to the monopsonist’s customers and increased 
overall consumer welfare.”); Kirkwood, supra note 227. 
232. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 12, at 230–31. See generally Kirkwood, supra note 
227, at 1537–57 (describing countervailing power scenarios that may result in consumer harm). 
233. The “quiet life” hypothesis suggests that firms with monopoly power may choose to incur 
inefficiencies rather than reap monopoly rents. See Michael Koetter et al., Enjoying the Quiet Life 
Under Deregulation? Evidence from Adjusted Lerner Indices for U.S. Banks, 94 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 462 (2012). 
234. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, ¶ 943b (“[P]owerful buyers might find it more 
profitable to share in their suppliers’ excess profits rather than trying to get supply prices down to 
competitive levels.”). 
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dominant insurer/dominant hospital cooperation in health care markets 
suggests that such scenarios are possible. For example, in West Penn 
Allegheny Health System, Inc. v. UPMC,235 the plaintiff alleged that 
Highmark, the dominant health insurer in the Pittsburgh area, and 
UPMC, the leading hospital system, conspired to protect each other from 
competition and to undertake measures designed to harm UPMC’s rival 
hospital in exchange for UPMC limiting competition to Highmark in the 
insurance market.236 Likewise, insurers in many markets have entered 
into “most favored nations agreements” with hospitals that reward 
hospitals for contractual commitments not to grant discounts to rival 
payers.237 In a number of other instances, providers and insurers have 
found it in their mutual interest to enter into exclusionary agreements 
that injure rivals of the provider.238 
In sum, the case law does not present a clear roadmap for applying 
power buyer considerations and applying a full-blown economic inquiry 
presents severe problems of administrability in litigation. We believe 
that the uncertainty that attends predictions of hard-nosed negotiations 
between buyers and sellers favors a cautious approach. The Areeda-
Hovenkamp analysis suggesting that courts should approach claims of 
mitigation from buyer power with skepticism is therefore warranted. 
Situations in which there are small rivals that would be unable to 
exercise buyer power and in which price discrimination is possible are 
particularly inappropriate for applying a power buyer offset. Courts 
                                                      
235. 627 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
236. See also Allen Bombardierie, A Handshake that Made Healthcare History, BOS. GLOBE 
(Dec. 28, 2008), www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2008/12/28/a_handshake_ 
that_made_healthcare_history/ [https://perma.cc/JBQ3-NFBK] (reporting agreement between 
dominant insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, and dominant hospital system Partners 
Health Care, pursuant to which Blue Cross agreed to give Partners higher levels of reimbursement, 
in exchange for Partners’ promise that it would demand the same rate increases from other payers). 
237. See, e.g., United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp. 2d 665, 665, 668 
(E.D. Mich. 2011) (denying motion to dismiss in case alleging dominant health insurer used 
anticompetitive “most favored nation” (MFN) clauses in its contracts with hospital providers to 
foreclose competition in health insurance market while also increasing hospitals’ reimbursement). 
The case was dismissed as moot after the Michigan legislature adopted legislation prohibiting MFN 
agreements. Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp. 
665 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (No. 2:10-cv-14155-DPH-MKM).   
238. See Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp., LLC v. Midwest Div., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 
1266, 1325 (D. Kan. 2007) (denying summary judgment in case involving alleged conspiracy 
between combination of hospitals accounting for seventy-four percent of local market and insurers 
accounting for ninety percent of managed care contracts to prevent new specialty hospital from 
obtaining managed care contracts); Texas v. Mem’l Hermann Healthcare Sys., No. 2009-04609 
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009) (settling antitrust claims that largest hospital system in Houston 
discouraged commercial insurers from contracting with rival hospitals by threats of termination or 
demands for large increases in reimbursement). 
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should also examine the history and proclivity of buyers and sellers in 
markets to engage in cooperative bargaining as another factor militating 
against recognition of the offset. 
CONCLUSION 
Rapidly evolving market conditions are spurring an increasing 
number of acquisitions by hospitals and health systems of provider 
groups. Yet courts and practitioners analyzing such transactions are 
entering largely uncharted territory. The vertical merger guidelines, 
written in 1984, are obsolete and provide little help for practitioners or 
courts seeking to analyze such acquisitions three decades on. The 
Agencies have filed no enforcement actions challenging vertical health 
care provider mergers. Although the Agencies have left open the 
possibility they will do so in the future, the FTC passed up the most 
recent opportunity to do so. In the recently concluded St. Luke’s 
litigation, the private plaintiff pursued such a theory, but the FTC 
ignored it. Perhaps as a result, so did the trial and appellate courts. 
Many—probably most—vertical transactions that courts and 
practitioners confront are competitively neutral or even beneficial. But 
some consolidations may harm consumer interests. Acquisitions of 
physician practices may be a strategy that some hospitals and systems 
use to undermine competition. At the same time, the history of antitrust 
law in health care is replete with meritless private lawsuits—such as 
those challenging hospital denials of staff privileges239—that likely 
deterred efficient reordering of hospital-physician arrangements. We 
offer the foregoing analysis and benchmarks in the hopes that courts and 
antitrust enforcers proceed, but with caution, in this important area. 
                                                      
239. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 77.  
